The Impact of European Private Law Upon the Mixed Legal Systems of Cyprus by Mouttotos, Nicholas
Journal of Civil Law Studies 
Volume 12 
Number 1 2019 Article 5 
10-9-2019 
The Impact of European Private Law Upon the Mixed Legal 
Systems of Cyprus 
Nicholas Mouttotos 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls 
 Part of the Civil Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Nicholas Mouttotos, The Impact of European Private Law Upon the Mixed Legal Systems of Cyprus, 12 J. 
Civ. L. Stud. (2019) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol12/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW UPON THE 
MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM OF CYPRUS 
Nicholas Mouttotos∗ 
 
I. Introduction ............................................................................... 96 
II. Mixed Jurisdictions .................................................................. 98 
A. Mixed Jurisdictions as a Model for Europe? ..................... 100 
B. The Mixed Legal System of Cyprus .................................. 103 
C. Historical Evolution ........................................................... 104 
D. The Legal System .............................................................. 115 
E. Contract and Commercial Law ........................................... 119 
III. The Impact of EU Law ......................................................... 124 
IV. Consumer Protection Under Cyprus Law ............................. 130 
A. The Unfair Contract Terms Directive ................................ 136 
B. The Directive Before Cyprus Courts .................................. 143 
C. The Impact on Procedural Law .......................................... 153 
V. Conclusions ............................................................................ 157 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article attempts to examine the impact of European private 
law upon the legal system of Cyprus taking into account its mixed 
elements and whether these elements have contributed towards a 
smooth reception of EU law. While Nikitas Hatzimihail argued in 
2013 that it may still be too early to assess the impact of European 
Union (EU) law upon the legal system of Cyprus, the financial crisis 
and its effects render such an assessment possible. Building upon 
Hatzimihail’s work in his effort at understanding a “unique” legal 
system by using comparative law theory to understand the doctrinal 
development and elaboration of Cyprus law, this article attempts to 
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offer its own contribution towards that end, by examining the impact 
of EU law upon the enforcement of contracts. 
The legal system of Cyprus reaffirms Sir Thomas Smith’s per-
ception of a mixed jurisdiction as a system where civil law and com-
mon law doctrines have been received and indeed contend for su-
premacy. These systems, that Vernon Valentine Palmer described as 
forming part of the “third legal family” are considered to be more 
receptive of outside influences, while their experience is considered 
valuable for the elaboration of a European private law. In this con-
text, the experience of European law reception in Cyprus, particu-
larly the Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, 
proves otherwise. Cyprus courts have given European standards a 
common law gloss despite the willingness to partake in European 
law. 
 
Keywords: mixed legal systems, comparative private law, unfair 
contract terms, harmonized European private law, Cyprus 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Given the multiplicity of legal sources and the classificatory 
vacuum that the previous taxonomies left with certain legal systems, 
an attempt was made less than two decades ago to renew the old 
research by creating a “living classification.”1 In this environment, 
Vernon Valentine Palmer proposed that mixed jurisdictions form a 
third legal family alongside the common law and continental law. 
This “novel epistemic move” that is growing with time, managed to 
put on the map of comparative law the peripheral systems of South 
Africa, Quebec, Scotland, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, thus cre-
ating a new field of comparative law. According to Glenn “[t]he 
concept of tradition [is] . . . an epistemological concept which is 
rooted in what can be called an epistemology of conciliation, as 
 
 1.  Esin Örücü, Family Trees for Legal Systems: Towards a Contemporary 
Approach, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 363 
(Mark van Hoecke ed., Hart Publ’g 2004) [hereinafter EPISTEMOLOGY AND METH-
ODOLOGY]. 
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opposed to an epistemology of conflict.”2 Mixed legal systems 
illustrate how this conciliation takes place.3 
Cyprus has only recently entered the map of comparative 
law literature regarding mixed jurisdictions.4 This was primar-
ily a result of the legal system being falsely categorized as part 
of the common law family, overlooking the ever-growing in-
fluence of continental law especially in the public law sphere. 
While it is true that in order to understand Cyprus law, one 
needs to think in common law terms, the influence of Greek 
law and legal thinking—as a result also of the role of the na-
tional language, which is primarily attached to the continental 
legal tradition (Greek language)—is changing the landscape. 
The legal elite in recent years, however, is pushing more to-
wards an understanding of the Cyprus legal system as a unique 
and intricate legal system and away from the common law ideal 
types, arguably as an attempt to maintain their power. 
This article is divided in two parts. The first part introduces 
the mixed jurisdiction theory and places Cyprus within the dis-
cussion; a remark is also made of the idea of mixed legal sys-
tems as a model for Europe; it then proceeds with a historical 
analysis leading to independence and the current state of the 
law. The second part examines the impact of EU law, in partic-
ular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (also known as Di-
rective 93/13) and the general framework of consumer protec-
tion in Cyprus. The article draws certain conclusions as a result 
of the jurisprudence of the courts regarding the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive. 
 
 2.  Patrick Glenn, Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions, in EPISTEMOLOGY 
AND METHODOLOGY, id. at 19-20. 
 3.  Seán P. Donlan, Comparative Law and Hybrid Legal Traditions: An In-
troduction, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND HYBRID LEGAL TRADITIONS 4 (Eleanor 
Cashin-Ritaine, Seán Patrick Donlan & Martin Sychold eds., Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law 2010). 
 4.  Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, Cyprus as a Mixed Legal System, 6 J. CIV. L. 
STUD. 95 (2013). 
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II. MIXED JURISDICTIONS 
Destined in a “classificatory limbo” mixed legal systems were 
dismissed in all efforts of classification, leading to their marginali-
zation without taking the time to analyze closely the common traits 
and shared experiences between them until relatively recently. 
Vernon Palmer suggests that as is the case with modern biological 
nomenclature, where Carolus Linnaeus in his two Kingdoms ap-
proach certain types of organisms (zoophytes) such as the sponge or 
coral did not fit into one of those Kingdoms, in comparative legal 
scholarship, we experience an analogous situation with the explana-
tion of legal phenomena that are only describable as mixed systems.5 
This dichotomy in comparative legal thinking was the reason for the 
emergence of the idea of classical “mixed jurisdiction.” Palmer, in 
his work devoted to the comparative treatment of systems such as 
South Africa and Scotland, argued that “the unity of the mixed ju-
risdiction ‘experience’ is palpable from the perspective of the jurists 
who live within them.”6 Jurists within such systems have a close 
understanding that stems from their knowledge of civil law, com-
mon law, and the English language: “[t]hey speak similar bijural di-
alects . . . .”7 
Two camps exist in comparative literature consisting of the clas-
sical “mixed jurisdiction” studies, which tends to focus on a single 
kind of hybrid, namely, the systems that straddle common law and 
civil law and, on the other hand, scholars of legal pluralism who use 
a more expansive and factually-oriented approach. Palmer and his 
predecessors such as Sir Thomas Smith8 and Frederick Parker Wal-
ton,9 represent the classical conception of mixed systems, which 
 
 5.  Vernon V. Palmer, Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems, 12 ELEC. 
J. COMP. L. (2008). See also Staffan Müller-Wille, Carolus Linnaeus, ENCY-
CLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://perma.cc/FT32-PH2R. 
 6.  See Palmer, supra note 5, at 2. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  THOMAS B. SMITH, A SHORT COMMENTARY ON THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND 
(W. Green & Son Ltd. 1962). 
 9.  Frederick P. Walton, The Civil Law and the Common Law in Canada, 11 
JURID. REV. 282 (1899). 
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limits the mixture of laws in Western hybrids; that is a system 
equally influenced by the common law and the civil law. Con-
versely, in more recent times the tendency is to include all elements 
of mixity of a system, be it indigenous with exogenous, religious 
with customary, western with non-western, in a more pluralist con-
ception that conceives a mixed system as one where two or more 
kinds of laws or legal traditions are present. As Esin Örücü points 
out, “all legal systems are mixed;”10 a view shared by Reinhard Zim-
mermann who argues that “all our national private laws in Europe 
today can be described as mixed legal systems.”11 This liberal con-
ception includes a broader pursuit of legal phenomena recognized 
by a state, but also includes unrecognized and unofficial laws not 
under state control, which constitute the living law.  
The justification for the “classical mixed jurisdiction theory” in 
limiting the mixture in a western hybrid lies in the deeper measure 
of comparability that the comparatist encounters when studying 
such systems. Although the liberal conception of mixed systems is 
valuable in understanding non-occidental personal laws, its task of 
comparing divergent laws is more difficult and less fruitful than 
within the classical circle.12 It transcends the conventional taxono-
mies of comparative law. Additionally, it is easy to discover five or 
six stromata of exogenous elements in a single legal system. None-
theless, the classical mixed jurisdiction theory conceptualized hy-
bridity in a new classificatory scheme, the third legal family. The 
word “family” is used in order to emphasize the “impressive” unity 
of these systems, despite their geographical remoteness, diversity of 
peoples, cultures, languages, etc. The study of the members of the 
third legal family brings to light the common traits and problems as 
 
 10.  Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?, 12 
ELEC. J. COMP. L. 2 (2008). See also Stephen Thomson, Mixed Jurisdiction and 
the Scottish Legal Tradition: Reconsidering the Concept of Mixture, 7 J. CIV. L. 
STUD. 51 (2014). 
 11.  REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, ROMAN LAW, CONTEMPORARY LAW, EURO-
PEAN LAW 159 (Clarendon Law Lectures, Oxford U. Press 2001). 
 12.  See Palmer, supra note 5. 
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well as a similarity in patterns of behavior within their legal systems. 
The effort was originally conceived for purposes of convenience, 
utility, and explanatory power has indeed flourished and trans-
formed from a one-man band into an “entire orchestra.” It has also 
seen the establishment of The World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction 
Jurists, an international organization that purports to support further 
research in the area.  
The specificity of the mixture is the first element that characterizes the 
legal systems of the “third legal family.”13 These systems are built upon 
the dual foundations of common law and civil law. This dual character of 
the law should be acknowledged by the actors and observers within the 
system. This constitutes the second characteristic, namely, the psycholog-
ical element that the dual foundations upon which the system is based are 
obvious to an ordinary observer. The final characteristic deals with the 
structure of the duality. Civil law dominates in the realm of private law, 
while common law in the field of public law. However, cases of reverse 
allocation are possible. Cyprus is the prime example, where private law, 
with the exception of family law, certain principles of property law and 
succession (which are influenced by Greek continental law) follows the 
English common law, while public law, with the exception of criminal law 
which is directed towards common law stereotypes, is based on continen-
tal law. 
A. Mixed Jurisdictions as a Model for Europe? 
Apart from the internal aspect of understanding the legal system, 
mixed legal systems are considered as vital in the context of European pri-
vate law as the study of legal systems already mixed can provide valuable 
lessons for all legal systems within the EU; since through cross-fertiliza-
tion and horizontal transfers, they will eventually mix to some degree.14 
Jan Smits, therefore, submits that the open-endedness of the 
 
 13.  VERNON V. PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD 
LEGAL FAMILY 28 et seq. (Vernon V. Palmer ed., Cambridge U. Press 2012). 
 14.  See Örücü, supra note 10, at 12. 
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idea of mixed systems as a model for Europe makes it an at-
tractive perspective in the debate about European harmoniza-
tion of private law.15 Drawing lessons from the development of 
mixed systems poses a number of questions such as “what is 
the type of experience that can be drawn?” Is the legal method 
of mixed jurisdictions superior to that of “pure” legal systems? 
Or is it substantive law that may offer fruitful insights? Smits 
reaches the conclusion that it is more likely the negative expe-
rience of mixed systems that can provide lessons for the pro-
cess of European harmonization.16  
Mixed jurisdictions have developed organically, something 
which runs counter to the idea of using the experience of such 
systems for the drafting of coherent sets of European princi-
ples. Smits thesis is based on the theory of regulatory compe-
tition, based on which competition for regulation leads to a dis-
covery process for new and potentially more efficient legal 
products.17 Jurisdictional competition on the other hand in-
volves interactions with other jurisdictions that create external 
competition for the supply of law. This empirical approach to 
cultural diversity allows for an analysis of certain solutions 
taken by other legal systems and the evaluation of their 
 
 15.  Jan M. Smits, Mixed Jurisdictions: Lessons for European Harmonisa-
tion?, 12 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2008). See also Hein Kötz, The Value of Mixed Legal 
Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 435 (2003-2004) (arguing that the experience of mixed 
legal systems may make a significant contribution to the great project of develop-
ing a European common law, and perhaps even of a European civil code) [here-
inafter Lessons for European Harmonisation?]. See also JAN M. SMITS, THE CON-
TRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS TO EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Intersentia 
2001) [hereinafter THE CONTRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS]. Hector 
MacQueen traced this idea about the value of mixed jurisdictions back to the 
French comparatist Lévy Ullman who observed that “Scots law gives us a picture 
of what will be some day the law of the civilized nations, namely a combination 
between Anglo-Saxon and the Continental system.” See Hector L. MacQueen, 
Scots Law and the Road to the New Ius Commune, Ius Commune Lectures on 
European Private Law, 4 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2000) (citing Lévy Ullman). 
 16.  See Smits, Lessons for European Harmonisation?, supra note 15. 
 17.  See Horst Eidenmueller, Collateral Damage: Brexit’s Negative Effects 
on Regulatory Competition and Legal Innovation in Private Law (ECGI Law, 
Working Paper no. 403, 2018). 
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functionality.18 The belief that was expressed in particular with 
Scots law is that it can contribute as a model for the development of 
private law in Europe; this was based on the premise that the mixture 
is one of quality, and not just that the mixture is of civil law and 
common law.19 Therefore, it is the critical picking and choosing of 
these systems from both legal traditions that should be a subject of 
further study. 
Various explanations were given for the process of legal bor-
rowing namely that selective borrowing is a result of “prestige”20 or 
it may result from a movement of legal systems towards more effi-
ciency;21 the latter also being influenced by the legal origins thesis, 
which explores whether economic performance of a country is the 
result of its legal system. Whether legal borrowing is influenced by 
one or the other parameters, it is not a conclusive fact.22 Neverthe-
less, mixed jurisdictions may provide insights as to the potential of 
successfully transplanting a foreign legal instrument. As Agustin 
Parise indicates from the case of Louisiana, legal borrowing can lead 
to successful results that exert influence in other legislative endeav-
ors.23 Mixed legal systems can contribute in this debate since they 
are arguably more receptive of transplants. 
 
 18.  On how judges change the law in mixed jurisdictions, see Biagio Andò, 
The Role of Judges in the Development of Mixed Legal Systems: The Case of 
Malta, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 238 (2011) (presenting the example of Malta). 
 19.  Jan M. Smits, Scotland as a Mixed Jurisdiction and the Development of 
European Private Law: Is There Something to Learn from Evolutionary Theory? 
7 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2003). 
 20.  As explained by Sacco who argued that “there are two fundamental 
causes of imitation: imposition and prestige.” See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal For-
mants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment II of II), 39 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 398 (1991). 
 21.  Raffaele Caterina, Comparative Law and Economics, in ELGAR ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 192 (2d ed., Jan M. Smits ed., Edward Elgar 
Publ’g 2012). 
 22.  On legal transplantation, see the seminal work of ALAN WATSON, LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed., U. of Georgia 
Press 1993). 
 23.  Agustín Parise, A Constant Give and Take: Tracing Legal Borrowings in 
the Louisiana Civil Law Experience, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 17 (2010). The text 
has influenced active and passive legal borrowing in the Americas, Asia and in 
Europe. 
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B. The Mixed Legal System of Cyprus 
Symeonides argued that “the legal system of Cyprus is a paradise 
of comparative law,”24 while Frank Hoffmeister said that Cyprus is 
an international and European lawyer’s goldmine.25 When com-
pared to the more populous mixed jurisdictions, the young legal sys-
tem of Cyprus can claim less juristic innovation. Nevertheless, it can 
also offer interesting case studies of hybridity and mutation of com-
mon law and continental legal institutions.26 It is said that such com-
parative work could help the “beleaguered mixed jurisdictions . . .  
overcome their intellectual isolation and assist in efforts to preserve 
and maintain the civilian tradition.”27  
As is the case with Cyprus, a number of mixed systems freely 
chose to become hybrid (e.g., Israel and Scotland), whereas the ma-
jority acted under varying degrees of compulsion. Cyprus resembles 
the development of the Israeli legal system as far as post-independ-
ence developments are concerned. For example, the structure of the 
Constitution transformed the legal system from a purely common 
law jurisdiction into a mixed system.28 The bilingualism of the sys-
tem and the power politics of the legal elites have strengthened and 
challenged its bijurality. The two neighboring legal systems both 
have taken the decision to leave all existing common law in place 
subject to future amendments and to preserve the rule that lacunae 
should be filled from importing rules from the English common law 
and equity. The decision to preserve the structure and substance of 
the common law, a system that was then associated with oppression 
and injustice, has been attributed to the inexperience of the legisla-
ture, and the main factor that lead to the so-called anglicization of 
 
 24.  Symeon C. Symeonides, The Mixed Legal System of the Republic of 
Cyprus, 78 TUL. L. REV. 442 (2003). 
 25.  FRANK HOFFMEISTER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 239 
(Martinus Nijhoff Pubs. 2006). 
 26.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 55. 
 27.  Palmer, supra note 5, at 13. 
 28.  See Talia Einhorn, The Common Law Foundations of the Israeli Draft 
Civil Code, 80 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 93 (2016). 
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the law.29 However, it has been described as a result of pragmatism 
rather than principle, an effort by the founding generations to find 
their place in the post-colonial era. As Hatzimihail points out, the 
personal biases of the dominant group of colonial advocates played 
a major role in the maintenance of the common law.30  
C. Historical Evolution 
The Republic of Cyprus, a former colony of the United Kingdom 
and a member of the Commonwealth, joined the European Union in 
2004. During the year of independence in 1960, the last and only 
island-wide official census took place, which estimated the island’s 
population at 550,000 people, composed of 81,14% Greek and 
18,86% Turkish Cypriots. The latest census regarding the popula-
tion that resides in the government-controlled area resulted in a pop-
ulation of 864,200, while previous versions estimated that 74,5% of 
the population is Greek and 9,8% is Turkish Cypriots.31 Geograph-
ically, Cyprus is closer to Turkey and the Middle East rather than 
Greek mainland. As the late Christopher Hitchens put it, “[its] fa-
vorable position, within such easy reach of Syria, Turkey and Egypt, 
has often been more of a curse than a boon . . . .”32 
Symeon Symeonides correctly points out that the “diverse ele-
ments that compose the law of Cyprus owe their origin and survival 
to its troubled political history; they are accidents of history.”33 A 
mixed system is by definition suggestive of a turbulent past, but also 
of an uncertain future. Cyprus long periods of foreign occupation, 
 
 29.  Symeonides, supra note 24, 450. See, e.g., the decision of the Polish to 
draw upon the Napoleonic Code and the civil codes of Germany and Austria, 
which is regarded as an effort not to endorse the legal institutions of a recent oc-
cupier. See Beata Gessel & Kalinowska vel Kalisz, Mixing Legal Systems in Eu-
rope; the Role of Common Law Transplants (Polish Law Example), 4 EUR. REV. 
PRIV. L. 793 (2017). 
 30.  Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 88. 
 31.  For more, see Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus, Demo-
graphic Report 2017 (Nov. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/7EVH-5N6K. 
 32.  CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, HOSTAGE TO HISTORY: CYPRUS FROM THE OT-
TOMANS TO KISSINGER 29 (Verso 1997). 
 33.  See Symeonides, supra note 24, at 454. 
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that is still present on the island, formed and is forming its legal sys-
tem. First, by the inheritance of the common law system and, sec-
ondly, by the prevailing sense of interim stage that the legal system 
is perceived to be, until Turkish Cypriots return on their posts. 
Therefore, the “Cyprus problem”34 malfunctions have spilled over 
in the legal system, while it is uncertain what the impact of a future 
political settlement will be. These malfunctions and particularities 
might be considered qualities, as they make the legal system of Cy-
prus intellectually intriguing for comparative lawyers.  
The Mycenaeans, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, 
Romans, Byzantines, Crusaders, Lusignans, Venetians, Turks, Brit-
ish, and Alexander the Great have all in turn exercised control and 
influence over the island, something that still has an effect in present 
day Cyprus, since it is a melting pot of languages, cultures as well 
as diverse laws. The most important conquerors of the island that 
shaped the present day’s pluralist nature of its legal system are the 
Byzantines, Turks, and British, and to a lesser extent the Venetians 
and the Lusignans.35 After the Ottoman rule, which lasted four cen-
turies, leaving its mark on the island, the United Kingdom ceded 
Cyprus in 1878 as a “place d’armes,”36 a product of bargain with 
 
 34.  The “Cyprus problem” is a term often used to describe the occupation 
and de facto division of the island. 
 35.  The Livre des Assises des Bourgeois, which was a collection of custom-
ary laws, is one of the most important monuments of European legal history. See 
THE ASSIZES OF THE LUSIGNAN KINGDOM OF CYPRUS (Nicholas Coureas trans., 
Cyprus Research Centre 2002). See also Seán P. Donlan, The Mediterranean Hy-
bridity Project: Crossing the Boundaries of Law and Culture, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 
355 (2011), on the various traditions that represent the extraordinary legal and 
normative hybridity of the Mediterranean region as a result of conquest, coloni-
zation and social and legal diffusion across shifting and porous political bounda-
ries. 
 36.  WILLIAM MALLINSON, CYPRUS: A MODERN HISTORY 10 (I. B. Tauris 
2005). The island had a role of a reserve place d’armes lying on the periphery of 
an area of vital concern to Britain. Historical evidence suggest that Cyprus would 
only acquire importance if Britain evacuated Egypt. Therefore, the island was not 
considered definitely useless, but it was also not disposable. See GEORGE S. GEOR-
GHALLIDES, A POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF CYPRUS, 1918-1926 
14 (Cyprus Research Centre 1979). 
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the weakened Ottoman Empire in return for protection against the 
expansionist aims of Russia.37 
As regards the legal system, despite the gradual introduction of the 
common law in Cyprus, certain laws that were introduced by the Tan-
zimat movement and initiated by the Ottomans still remained in force, 
such as the communal administration of justice system, an element that 
comes closer to the classic definition of a mixed jurisdiction even during 
the colonial era.38 During Ottoman rule, the Commercial Code of 1850, 
the Criminal Code of 1858, and the Maritime Code of 1863, which were 
introduced in Cyprus, were based on the respective French codes. With 
the 1878 Supplementary Agreement to the Cyprus Convention that 
stripped the Sultan of all his substantive powers over the island, the 
Queen of England was invested with “full powers for making Laws and 
Conventions for the Government of the Island of Cyprus in her Maj-
esty’s name, and for the regulation of its Commercial and Consular rela-
tions and affairs free from the Porte’s control.”39 Britain introduced a 
series of reforms such as the independent currency system, the abolition 
of capitulations and consular courts, the establishment of a new judicial 
organization, and the enactment of a representative Legislative Coun-
cil.40 Until 1935, when common law almost entirely replaced Ottoman 
law, the residual law of the country was implemented making recourse 
to English law to avoid manifest injustice and to fill gaps in the law.41 
 
 37.  See GEORGHALLIDES, supra note 36, at 4 et seq. In June 4, 1878, Sir 
Austen Layard and Safvet Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, signed an Anglo-
Turkish Convention of Defensive Alliance which stipulated that Britain would go 
to Turkey’s assistance in the vent of the renewal of Russian attacks in Asiatic 
Turkey and the occupation and administration of Cyprus to be given to Britain in 
order to be able to carry out its military obligations to Turkey. See also Andreas 
Neocleous & David Bevir, Legal History, in INTRODUCTION TO CYPRUS LAW 6 
(Dennis Campbell ed., A. Neocleous & Co., Yorkhill Law Publ’g 2000) [herein-
after INTRODUCTION TO CYPRUS LAW]. 
 38.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 40. 
 39.  Correspondence respecting the Island of Cyprus, C. 2229, London 
(1879). See also GEORGHALLIDES, supra note 36, at 11. 
 40.  Id. According to Georghallides, the enactment of the Council came in 
spite of the protests by the Turkish Cypriot leaders and the Porte. 
 41.  See section 1202 of the Mejelle (Civil Code of the Ottoman Empire): “It 
is considered as a great nuisance that a place used by women such as the kitchen, 
the mouth of the well and the yard of a house should be seen.” See also Hassan 
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During that period, English judges applied English rules of in-
terpretation of the law, giving a new dimension to its applica-
tion—what Hatzimihail calls mutation.42 
Ottoman law was partly preserved by the British by recog-
nizing the jurisdiction of the Moslem Religious Courts to ad-
judicate matters of personal status of the Muslim inhabitants of 
the island,43 while Byzantine law was preserved through the 
recognition of the jurisdiction of the Episcopal Courts and the 
law-making authority of the Orthodox church for matters of 
personal status of the Greek Orthodox inhabitants.44 The 
 
Erikzade v. Georghi Arghiro (1890) 1 C.L.R. 84, the court noted that (emphasis 
added): 
Now it is to be observed that, prima facie, a man is entitled to use his 
property in any way he pleases; and he is further entitled to the free ac-
cess of light and air to his property unless his rights are restricted by any 
law, or unless the owner of adjoining property has acquired some ease-
ment recognized by the law, which interferes with the free exercise of 
these rights. Such a restriction on the natural right of a man to make use 
of his property in any way he pleases, is contained in the section of the 
Mejelle last above referred to, and we consider that in construing a law, 
which is restrictive of the natural rights of individuals, a strict construc-
tion must be placed upon it, that is to say, we must construe it in such a 
way that the enjoyment of his property by the defendant shall be inter-
fered with as little as possible. 
Therefore, Section 1202 of the Mejelle was interpreted in line with English law 
to avoid manifest injustice. See also GEORGE M. PIKIS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENG-
LISH COMMON LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND THEIR APPLICATION IN A FOR-
MER BRITISH COLONY, CYPRUS 73 (Brill Nijhoff 2017). 
 42.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 38. 
 43.  Article I of the Annex to the 1878 Convention obliged Britain to ensure 
that Moslem Sheri Law would be administered by special courts in religious and 
family matters affecting the members of the Turkish community, establishing 
“[t]hat a Mussulman religious Tribunal (Mehkeme-I Sheri) shall continue to exist 
in the island, which will take exclusive cognizance of religious matters, and of no 
others, concerning the Mussulman population of the island.” See The Cyprus Con-
vention, Convention of Defensive Alliance Between Great Britain and Turkey 
with Respect of the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, U.K.-Turk., June 4, 1878. Geor-
ghallides points out that, unlike the religious courts of the Greek Orthodox 
Church, the Moslem courts continued to have all their expenses defrayed by the 
Cyprus budget. See GEORGHALLIDES, supra note 36, at 358. 
 44.  A similar approach was followed in India. See GILLES CUNIBERTI, 
GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS 398 (2d ed., Lextenso 2011). The 
composition of the Supreme Court was a subject of contention in 1925 since it 
consisted of two British Judges, the Greek elected members of the Legislative 
Council argued that such a composition was deprived of detailed knowledge of 
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essential characteristics of the millet system were thus main-
tained and the British administrator modernized the faith-groups as 
ethnic communities, transforming at the same time the “quasi-medi-
eval community elites into ‘ethno-communal elites’ . . . .”45 The mil-
let was a form of indirect rule according to religious difference 
adopted by the Ottomans.46 
In 1925, Cyprus formally became a British colony and English 
substantive law began its conquest of the land. The gradual imposi-
tion of common law over the legal system, a policy of “structured 
mixité”47 was based on the rule of international law that provides 
that the laws of a conquered country continue in force, until they are 
altered by the conqueror.48 Palmer suggests that neither British nor 
American decision makers based their policies on this rule; rather 
they exercised discretion taking into account demographic, political, 
and social factors such as introducing foreign language to an uncom-
prehending population.49 This may be shown in the judgment of 
Chief Justice Hallinan in Universal Advertising and Publishing 
Agency v. Panayiota A. Vouros,50 where it was stressed that the 
 
local habits, customs and laws such as of Moslem religious and Greek canon law. 
See GEORGHALLIDES, supra note 36, at 358. 
 45.  Nicos Trimikliniotis, Nationality and Citizenship in Cyprus Since 1945: 
Communal Citizenship, Gendered Nationality and the Adventures of a Post-Co-
lonial Subject in a Divided Country, in CITIZENSHIP POLICIES IN THE NEW EUROPE 
391 (Rainer Bauböck, Bernhard Perchinig & Wiebke Sievers eds., Amsterdam U. 
Press 2009). 
 46.  Karen Barkey & George Gavrilis, The Ottoman Millet System: Non-Ter-
ritorial Autonomy and Its Contemporary Legacy, 15 ETHNOPOLITICS 26 (2016). 
 47.  Patrick H. Glenn, Quebec: Mixité and Monism, in STUDIES IN LEGAL 
SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING 3-8 (Esin Örücü, Elspeth Attwool & Sean Coyle 
eds., Kluwer Law Int’l 1996). 
 48.  Campbell v. Hall (1774) 1 Cowp. All ER Rep 252 1045, at 1047, as per 
Lord Mansfield: “The laws of a conquered country continue in force, until they 
are altered by the conqueror.” Under the common law doctrine of reception, the 
laws of a conquered or ceded territory remained in force unless and until they are 
altered by the conquering nation. See Ulla Secher, The Mabo Decision—Preserv-
ing the Distinction Between ‘Settled’ and ‘Conquered or Ceded’ Territories, 24 
UQ LAW J 35 (2005). See Mabo v. Queensland (No 2) [hereinafter Mabo case] 
HCA 23; 175 CLR 1, 35 (1992). 
 49.  PALMER, supra note 13, at 28. 
 50.  Universal Advertising and Publishing Agency v. Panayiota A. Vouros, 
19 C.L.R. 87, 94 (1957) [hereinafter Universal Advertising and Publishing 
Agency]. 
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principles of the common law of England do not fit Cyprus in their 
totality.51  
According to Christian Burset, the political reasons behind such 
policies is the belief, on the one hand, that by withholding English 
law, the Empire kept the colonies culturally isolated, economically 
dependent, and politically docile; on the other hand, that Britain 
should govern all colonies based on a global common law that 
would both reflect and promote the equality of all British subjects.52 
Applying the legal origins perspective to such distinct approaches to 
legal transplantation, in particular, the view that the common law is 
more favorable to free markets and supports a less statist approach 
to governing, Burset argues that the proponents of withholding Eng-
lish law did so as such imposition would bar the door to government 
intervention.53 English law provided important protections against 
authoritarianism and expropriation. On the other hand, the support-
ers of a global common law wanted a legal system that supported a 
particular political-economic agenda.  
The gradual imposition of English law in Cyprus can be 
explained from a policy standpoint since Cyprus was initially 
regarded as an “inconsequential possession,” while at a later stage it 
acquired a heightened role as a result of the importance of its 
geographical position in defending the Suez Canal.54 English 
common law totally replaced the pre-existing legal system until 
independence when the island was regarded as a definite member of 
the common law tradition.55 This illustrates that conquest itself, 
 
 51.  See PIKIS, supra note 41, at 75. 
 52.  Christian R. Burset, Why Didn’t the Common Law Follow the Flag? 105 
VA. L. REV. 483, 535 (2019). 
 53.  Id. at 50. 
 54.  ANDREKOS VARNAVA, BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN CYPRUS, 1878-1915: 
THE INCONSEQUENTIAL POSSESSION (Manchester U. Press 2009). See also GEOR-
GHALLIDES, supra note 36, at 10. 
 55.  Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, Reconstructing Mixity: Sources of Law and Legal 
Method in Cyprus, in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS, EAST AND WEST 75 (Vernon V. 
Palmer, Mohamed Y. Mattar & Anna Koppel eds., Routledge 2016). From the 
Tanzimat reformation, the Penal Code remained in force until 1928, the Commer-
cial Code until 1930, and the Ottoman Land Code until 1946. 
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while indeed a “triggering event” of legal change, does not create a 
mixed jurisdiction.56 
The principle of binding precedent was applicable in the same 
spirit as in England. Therefore, decisions of the High Court were 
binding on first instance courts, whereas the High Court of Cyprus 
was bound by decisions of the Privy Council. Decisions of the High 
Court of Cyprus were appealable before the Privy Council. First in-
stance decisions of the English High Court were of persuasive au-
thority. According to George Pikis, decisions of the High Court of 
Cyprus were assimilated in terms of binding precedent to first in-
stance decisions of the High Court of England.57 The Courts of Jus-
tice Order of 1935 set forth that the common law and principles of 
equity as they stood in England in 1914 were applicable. This pro-
vision, according to Pikis, was ignored as the assimilation of the de-
cisions to those of the High Court of England indicates. This has 
resulted in a failure of adjusting the common law and principles of 
equity to the needs of Cyprus and the idiosyncrasy of its people not-
withstanding the fact that common law is a living body meant to 
respond to the living needs of society.58 
Chief Justice Hallinan underlined in the Universal Advertising 
and Publishing Agency59 case that the common law must be trans-
planted in Cyprus as a living organism, with the necessary legal and 
judicial adjustments to meet the needs of the people of Cyprus. 
Pikis, in emphasizing Lord Denning’s dicta in Nyali Ltd.. v. Attorney 
General,60 where he stressed that the common law cannot be applied 
in a foreign land without considerable qualification, argues that little 
effort was made in that direction. Lord Denning stressed that, just as 
with an English oak, although the English common law will flourish 
in a foreign land, it will need careful tending. The common law, ac-
cording to Lord Denning, “has many principles of manifest justice 
 
 56.  PALMER, supra note 13, at 30. 
 57.  See PIKIS, supra note 41, at 74. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Universal Advertising and Publishing Agency, supra note 50. 
 60.  Nyali Ltd.. v. Attorney General (1956) 1 Q.B. 16. 
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and good sense which can be applied with advantage to peoples of 
every race and colour all the world over: but it has also many refine-
ments, subtleties and technicalities which are not suited to other 
folk. These off-shoots must be cut away.” 
 In post-independence Cyprus, such adjustments have been 
made, in limited cases though, as is seen from cases such as KEM 
(Taxi) Ltd. v. Anastasis Tryphonos,61 where it was emphasized that 
the reaction of employer and employee in the context of a labor dis-
pute in Cyprus may take different form from a corresponding reac-
tion in England.  
Consequently, since 1945 Cypriots are the only Europeans to 
have undergone colonial rule, guerilla war, civil war, and modern 
technological war on their soil.62 Also, as of 1945 and onwards, the 
struggle for enosis (unification with Greece) and the demand for 
freedom and self-determination was renewed.63 To counter any anti-
colonial movements, the British offered constitutional proposals 
that were rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The subversive organiza-
tion of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was 
formed and an armed rebellion began in 1955 and lasted until 1959, 
a few days before Cyprus gained the status of an independent state. 
The British colonial rule suppressed civil liberties and imposed 
harsh reprisals, while reinforcing Turkish radicalization and claims 
to partition the island as a counterweight to the struggle for unifica-
tion with Greece.64 The Zurich-London Accords of 1960, despite 
different aspirations, imposed independence on the people of Cy-
prus.65 According to late President Makarios, this marked the 
 
 61.  KEM (Taxi) Ltd. v. Anastasis Tryphonos (1969) 1 C.L.R. 52. 
 62.  HITCHENS, supra note 32, at 12. 
 63.  Neocleous & Bevir, supra note 37, at 7. 
 64.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 48; MALLINSON, supra note 36, at 31 
et seq. 
 65.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 48. According to Polyviou, the thesis 
about “an imposed settlement” was advanced in numerous legal opinions, letters 
and notes prepared and issued by the then Attorney General of the Republic of 
Cyprus, Mr Criton Tornaritis, from 1961 onwards. See POLYVIOS G. POLYVIOU, 
CYPRUS: A STUDY IN THE THEORY, STRUCTURE AND METHOD OF THE LEGAL SYS-
TEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS 8 (Cryssafinis & Polyviou 2015). 
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creation of a state but not of a nation. The notion of a nation-state, a 
term that presupposes the congruence of a particular ethnic group 
and a territory,66 is therefore absent from the outset. The Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Cyprus was attached to these agreements; a 
constitution that is argued to be drafted by a joint committee of 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot jurists. However, its travaux prépa-
ratoires are yet to be published.67 Since Cypriots had a minimal role 
in drafting it, few felt it to be sacred.68 The Constitution divided the 
citizens of the republic into a Greek and Turkish community and 
provided for a binary/bi-communal government with presidential 
characteristics in a consociational system.69 This model of govern-
ment is akin to federalism, as it distributes political authority on a 
functional or personal basis.70 
The Constitution has been characterized as one of the most pe-
culiar in the constitutional world.71 It is a rather lengthy instrument 
with several provisions having the character of fundamental, basic 
articles, not capable of any revision or amendment.72 Accordingly, 
the Constitution has been described as: “probably the most rigid in 
 
 66.  Alison D. Renteln, Ethnicity, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford U. Press 2011). 
 67.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 48. 
 68.  HITCHENS, supra note 32, at 55. 
 69.  The consociational model was derived from the political experience of 
Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. As to the democratic system, 
it represents the complement of the Anglo-American model. AREND LIJPHART, 
DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION 6 (Yale U. 
Press 1977). See also Carleton W. Sterling, Consociational Democracy, 40 REV. 
POL. 303 (1978). 
 70.  George E. Devenish, Federalism Revisited: The South African Para-
digm, 17 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 129 (2006). 
 71.  Pavlos Neofytou Kourtellos, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO 
CYPRUS LAW, supra note 37, at 16. Jan Smits measures complexity in law by 
looking at the different factors of density, technicality, institutional differentiation 
and indeterminacy and finds that the Constitution of Cyprus is highly difficult to 
understand, while in general, the legal system scores high on complexity. Jan M. 
Smits, Do Small Jurisdictions Have a More Complex Law? A Numerical Experi-
ment in Constitutional and Private Law (Maastricht European Private Law Insti-
tute, Working Paper no. 2015/05, 2015). 
 72.  According to Tornaritis (Attorney General from 1960 to 1984) “such 
provisions are contrary to the accepted principles of public law and the current 
constitutional practice.” See CRITON TORNARITIS, CYPRUS AND ITS CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND OTHER LEGAL PROBLEMS 55 (Proodos Ltd. 1977). 
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the world. It is certainly the most detailed and . . . most complicated. 
It is weighed down by checks and balances, procedural and substan-
tive safeguards, guarantees and prohibitions. Constitutionalism has 
run riot in harness with Communalism.”73 
The bi-communal administration was unfortunately short-lived, 
as three years after independence, the republic was faced with a ma-
jor political and constitutional crisis after the departure of the Turk-
ish Cypriots from their posts in the executive and legislative func-
tions.74 Their withdrawal was the result of the proposal for constitu-
tional amendments by President Makarios to remove obstacles to the 
smooth functioning of the State. After the presentation of these pro-
posals, inter-communal violence broke out. The majority of the 
members of the Turkish Cypriot community were secluded into en-
claves with strong lines of defense.75 The proper functioning of the 
state was made possible thanks to the doctrine of necessity. This 
doctrine provides that when the compliance with constitutional pro-
visions is rendered impossible due to the exceptional and unforeseen 
circumstances, which the framers of the Constitution never contem-
plated (e.g., the non-participation of Turkish Cypriots in the institu-
tions of the republic), the relevant constitutional provisions are 
deemed to be amended so that the state can avoid complete paraly-
sis.76 
 
 73.  STANLEY A. DE SMITH, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH AND ITS CONSTITU-
TIONS 285 (Stevens 1964). 
 74.  The Turkish Cypriot judges remained in their posts for a few more years, 
while the Turkish Cypriot High Court Judge Mehmet Zekia became the united 
Supreme Court’s (merged Supreme Constitutional Court and High Court) first 
President and first Cypriot judge at the European Court of Human Rights. See 
Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 67. 
 75.  NIKOS SKOUTARIS, THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A MEM-
BER STATE UNDER SIEGE 24 (Hart Publ’g 2011). 
 76.  Particularly, it was held that the Constitution can be amended by a law 
passed by a majority of two-thirds of the Greek Cypriot members of the House of 
Representatives alone. See Nicolaou v. Nicolaou (1992) 1 C.L.R. 1338. See also 
Constantinos Lykourgos, Cyprus Public Law as Affected by Accession to the Eu-
ropean Union, in STUDIES IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW: THEMATIC, NATIONAL AND 
POST-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 103 (Constantinos Kombos ed., Sakkoulas Publi-
cations 2010). 
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From 1963 until 1974, the two communities were engaged in 
negotiations to find a comprehensive and viable solution for the is-
land. However, a coup d’état, orchestrated by the military junta of 
Greece that upset legality, was used as a pretext by Turkey to invade 
the island, causing a humanitarian catastrophe and establishing a ge-
ographical and ethnical division. Turkey seized approximately 36% 
of the territory of Cyprus and expelled approximately 170,000 
Greek Cypriots from their lawful residences.77 Turkey based its op-
eration on article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, which provides that 
the guarantor states (Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) have 
the “right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state 
of affairs.” The “right of action” was thus interpreted as the right to 
use force unilaterally, which is expressly prohibited under article 
2(4) of the UN Charter.78 The Security Council expressed “its formal 
disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Re-
public of Cyprus.”79 On November 15, 1983, the self-proclaimed “Turk-
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) emerged as the “exercise of 
self-determination” of the Turkish Cypriots.80 The UN Security Council 
deplored the “secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus”81 and called 
upon all states not to recognize the purported state “set up by secessionist 
acts.”82 The unlawfulness of the TRNC has been consistently dealt with 
by legal means from the first moment. It was also upheld by the European 
Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice.83 
 
 77.  In what regards the island’s territory, 59,5% is under the control of the 
Republic of Cyprus, 35,2% under Turkish occupation and 2,6% is the buffer zone, 
while 2,7% constitute British sovereign bases. 
 78.  Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 
53: “A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law.” 
 79.  S.C. Res. 360 (Aug. 16, 1974). 
 80.  According to de Wet, no general right of a minority to secede has been 
recognized in international law. ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 328 (Studies in International Law, Hart 
Publ’g 2004). 
 81.  S.C. Res. 541 (Nov. 18, 1983). 
 82.  S.C. Res. 550 (May 11, 1984). 
 83.  See European Court of Human Rights, Cyprus v. Turkey, application no. 
25781/94, May 12, 2014. See also International Court of Justice, Accordance with 
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Nevertheless, talks continued with an aim to find a comprehensive 
and viable solution in the context of a bi-zonal, bi-communal feder-
ation and end this unprecedented political anomaly. To this day, and 
despite ongoing talks, Turkey’s military holds 36% of the territory. 
While the bi-communal structure of the Republic of Cyprus func-
tions according to the doctrine of necessity, the Turkish Cypriot 
community is expected to return and reclaim their seats, once it is 
set free from Turkey.84 
D. The Legal System 
Two ideas usually exist for Cyprus: first that of an insular para-
dise, the birthplace of Aphrodite, the perfect beaches and mountains, 
the olive groves, the gentle people, and the wine-dark sea; and sec-
ondly that of an unprecedented political anomaly, often seen as an 
insoluble Gordian Knot. In this vivid imagery that author Christo-
pher Hitchens used to describe Cyprus,85 two ideas can be added: its 
legal system and the recent financial crisis that led to the first time 
when creditors (and even depositors) of a bank were called upon to 
finance the banks’ deficit (the so-called bail-in).86  
The elements that make up Cyprus law are reversely allocated 
compared to other mixed jurisdictions87 presenting into the theory 
 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, July 22, 2010, no. 141, § 81. 
 84.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 51. Turkish Cypriot property in the area 
controlled by the republic is held in trust by the government, pending resolution 
of the Cyprus problem. See Turkish Cypriot Properties (Management and Other 
Topics) Law L. 139/91. 
 85.  HITCHENS, supra note 32, at 19. 
 86.  For the legal implications, see Myron M. Nicolatos (President of the Su-
preme Court of Cyprus, Substitute Member of the Venice Commission), European 
Commission for Democracy Through Law, Austerity Measures and Economic 
Crisis. The Case of Cyprus—A Judge’s approach (2014). 
 87.  See also Agustín Parise, Codification of the Law in Louisiana: Early 
Nineteenth-Century Oscillation Between Continental European and Common 
Law Systems, 27 TULANE EUR. CIV. L. FORUM (2012) (looking at the codification 
endeavors that took place in Louisiana during the early American period until 
before the developments of the Civil War, where the drafters were representatives 
of both continental European and common law traditions that resulted in an “ec-
lectic work”). 
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of mixed jurisdiction with a “juridical unicorn,” i.e., common law 
has a stronghold in private law with the exception of non-commer-
cial matters and criminal law, whereas public law is based on civil-
ian stereotypes. Procedural law follows common law as all other 
mixed jurisdictions. However, in the case of Cyprus, it is vital to 
think in common law terms in order to understand Cyprus law.88 
Procedural law has acted as a vehicle for the introduction of com-
mon law notions into areas of substantive law that are oriented to-
wards the continental legal tradition, and for ensuring the persis-
tence of a common law mentality.89 Thus, the legal system of Cy-
prus reaffirms Sir Thomas Smith’s perception that a mixed jurisdic-
tion is a system where civil law and common law doctrines have 
been received and indeed contend for supremacy.90 
Cyprus more closely resembles a common law jurisdiction than 
other mixed jurisdictions; however, the civilian influence is con-
stantly expanding in new areas of the law. Additionally, most of the 
legislation has been imported or transplanted from abroad. Accord-
ing to Hatzimihail, this importation has often resulted in veritable 
transplants, while in other instances resulted in the formation of al-
tered legal regimes, evoking Gunther Teubner’s idea of legal irri-
tants.91 For example, the courts have given the principle of good 
faith, provided under the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, a com-
mon law gloss by focusing on an absence of dishonesty in agreeing 
upon the terms. All this adds to the amazingly complex picture of a 
unique legal system that Hatzimihail envisaged.  
The journey of mixedness of Cyprus law has taken a “contrari-
wise movement,”92 since the common law has emigrated rather than 
 
 88.  Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, On Law, Legal Elites and the Legal Profession 
in a (Biggish) Small State: Cyprus, in SMALL STATES IN A LEGAL WORLD 217 
(Petra Butler & Caroline Morris eds., Springer 2017). 
 89.  Id. at 228. 
 90.  Thomas B. Smith, Property and Trust, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (René David et al. eds., Tübingen 1972). 
 91.  Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How 
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998). 
 92.  PALMER, supra note 13, at 9. 
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migrated as in almost all mixed jurisdictions. Apart from the fact 
that Cyprus law tends to agree on terms of constitutional form, the 
principles of separation of powers, the independence of the judge, 
judicial review of governmental acts, due process of law, free 
speech, and freedom from arbitrary search and arrest, public law is 
strongly influenced by Greek administrative law.93 Moreover, the 
constitution provided under article 146 for a separate Constitutional 
Court with original jurisdiction over administrative law cases. The 
principle of ne bis in idem or “double jeopardy,” which is of conti-
nental origin, is also applicable via article 12.2 of the Constitution 
of Cyprus.94 
This allocation arose from constitutional provisions such as ar-
ticle 146, which establishes jurisdiction over petitions to annul or 
confirm administrative acts in the spirit of the French recours en 
annulation. Another example is article 188 of the Constitution; this 
provision states that the laws applicable until independence will 
continue to be in force and be interpreted in line with the Constitu-
tion as well as organic laws such as the Courts of Justice Law, which 
provided for the common law doctrines of equity95 to be sources of 
law unless otherwise provided for by law or the Constitution, 
thereby confirming the colonial status quo.96 As Hatzimihail points 
out, independence should have led Cyprus away from the common 
law tradition as it empowered a people attached to motherlands and 
languages falling firmly within the continental legal tradition. Nev-
ertheless, it confirmed the place of the colonial legal, business, and 
administrative elite as well as its capacity to absorb new entrants, a 
form of rent-seeking as explained by Anthony Ogus.97  
 
 93.  Greek administrative law is based on French doctrine, see EPAMINONDAS 
SPILIOTOPOULOS, GREEK ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Ant. N. Sakkoulas 2004). 
 94.  See Attorney General (Article 7) (1993) 1 C.L.R. 793. 
 95.  Translated as principles of equity. 
 96.  See Courts of Justice Law no. 14/60 (1960), art. 29 [hereinafter Courts 
of Justice Law]. 
 97.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 216. See Anthony Ogus, The Contri-
bution of Economic Analysis of Law to Legal Transplants, in THE CONTRIBUTION 
OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 15. 
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According to Symeonides, this statute passed by an inexperi-
enced House of Representatives went much further than the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution, tying the legal system of Cyprus in a 
permanent and surreptitious manner to the English common law.98 
This provision had no temporal limitation; hence, it authorized the 
application of post-independence common law along with pre-inde-
pendence laws. It also made common law binding rather than per-
suasive upon courts leading to the so-called anglicization of the 
law.99 However, the republic was born in “an uneasy truce between 
realities and aspirations,” with the various social groups and legal 
and political elites trying to find their place in the post-colonial 
era.100 In any case, the institutional arrangements would have disal-
lowed significant law reform as the sharing of power proved already 
problematic in 1963 when the Turkish members of the House of 
Representatives rejected the budget.101 The decision for mainte-
nance of the status quo was, therefore, the easy way out, as it left 
the option for a future law reform, on which there was no consensus 
at the time and did not have the intellectual structure to begin 
with.102 However, as former Judge Pikis points out:  
The inheritance of English law in Cyprus had positive effects 
in relation to human rights, including property rights. It is no 
coincidence that despite the blows inflicted upon Cyprus in 
1974, the rule of law retained its force, the State survived, 
helping in the sustenance of the Republic of Cyprus becom-
ing in due course a member of the European Union.103  
It is obvious that personal biases of the dominant group of colo-
nial advocates played a major role in the maintenance of the com-
mon law.104 Following independence, Cyprus Bar membership 
 
 98.  The task was undertaken by a well-known former servant of Her Maj-
esty’s government according to Symeonides, supra note 24, at 450. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 55. 
 101.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 216. 
 102.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 55. 
 103.  See PIKIS, supra note 41, at 98 (emphasis added). 
 104.  For the last thirty years of Colonial rule, membership to the Cyprus Bar 
had been preserved for barristers trained in England. See Advocates Law (Cap. 2) 
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begun expanding significantly, with a new wave of lawyers coming 
from non-legal families and holders of university degrees from 
Greek law schools. This resulted in a cultural conflict, with traces 
that are still visible today. Maintenance of the English common law 
became a vehicle for the dominance of the established group of co-
lonial advocates, and their children, in the emerging legal profession 
of Cyprus.105 But this internal conflict is best illustrated in the use 
of the English language: it took three decades after independence for 
the legal system to complete the transition from English to the re-
public’s official languages. Hatzimihail stresses that perhaps it is not 
mere coincidence that it took a little more than three decades after 
independence for the first Cypriot graduates of a Greek law school 
to reach the appellate bench. Be that as it may, this did not act as an 
obstacle for a unique Cypriot legal identity to be formed, shifting 
away from common law ideal types.106 
E. Contract and Commercial Law 
Cyprus commercial and contract law is patterned after English 
statutory models. The majority of mixed jurisdictions at their 
founding had a civilian-based commercial law, which was later 
taken over by common law rules mainly based on the idea that the 
requirements of commerce are best served via common law rules 
and that old commercial law was inadequate to cope with them.107 
 
(1955), art. 3: admission to practice as an advocate was reserved to those “entitled 
to practice” as a barrister-at-law or “admitted to practice” as a solicitor in England 
or Northern Ireland, or as an advocate in Scotland. See also Hatzimihail, supra 
note 55. 
 105.  Hatzimihail stresses that the most influential groups within the legal pro-
fession—appellate judges and the notables that used to belong to families that 
trace their origins in the profession to the colonial-era advocates—are the ones 
who most closely identify with the common law. Therefore, these groups had a 
vested right to act as gatekeepers and refrain from opening the system to new 
entrants who were educated in Greece. See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 234. 
 106.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 242. 
 107.  Id. at 92. See also Jacques du Plessis, Common Law Influences on the 
Law of Contract and Unjustified Enrichment in Some Mixed Legal Systems, 78 
TUL. L. REV. 219 (2016). Du Plessis examines the common law influence with 
regards to causa and consideration, promissory estoppel and reasonable reliance, 
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New legislation in Cyprus relating to contract law simply replaced 
previous English statutory transplants as is the case with the Sale of 
Goods Act.108 The dominance of English contract and commercial 
law is evident from the fact that legislative deviations from the 
English paradigm such as the Vienna Convention on the Sale of 
Goods, also known as the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),109 as well as statutes 
implementing EU derivative law, are only absorbed very gradually 
in legal practice and caselaw.110 Despite the fact that the Vienna 
Convention on the Sale of Goods entered into force over a decade 
ago in Cyprus—which could have led to an autonomous source of 
law with its own interpretation and application, separate from the 
common law—the CISG has yet to generate any caselaw.111 It may 
be argued that this reflects a preference towards the English law of 
sale, which is preferred as the governing law in international 
sales.112  
The impact of EU derivative law is just beginning to be felt in 
contractual practice and caselaw, mainly through the Unfair 
 
offer, acceptance and the mailbox theory, undue influence and good faith, 
anticipatory breach and repudiation and the condictio indebiti. 
 108.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 227-28. New legislation on Sale of 
Goods enacted in 1994 (L. 10(I)/1994) replaced the English Sale of Goods Act of 
1893 (applicable under Sale of Goods Law (Cap. 267), L.25/1953) with the Eng-
lish Sale of Goods Act of 1979. 
 109.  United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG), 1980. According to Rogowska, the English legal system has 
achieved wide international acceptance and familiarity since, despite the ad-
vantages of the CISG, business parties worldwide have frequently incorporated 
English law into their international sales contracts. See Anna Rogowska, Some 
Considerations on the Desirability of Accession to the CISG by the UK, 2 ELEC. 
J. COMP. L. (2013). 
 110.  Id. at 228. 
 111.  Id. According to Hatzimihail, even legal literature makes no reference of 
the CISG being applicable in Cyprus. See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 228. The 
absence of caselaw on the CISG can be seen by the data available on the “Case 
Law on UNCITRAL Texts” (CLOUT) of UNCITRAL, https://perma.cc/6V6K-
XDY3. 
 112.  Min Yan, Remedies Under the Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods and the United Kingdom’s Sale of Goods Act: A Comparative 
Examination, 3 CITY U. H.K. L. REV. 111 (2011). 
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Contract Terms Directive.113 Directive 93/13 was implemented al-
ready prior to accession. However, the prohibition against unfair 
terms has only recently started to excerpt influence in contracts, 
while discussions are being held for a possible extension of the fair-
ness clause to SMEs.114 Effective consumer protection, though, is 
still in its early stages. This contrasts with the inroads that the prin-
ciple of good faith has made into English caselaw.115 The reasoning 
in most contract cases in Cyprus, however, is not comparable to ap-
pellate English opinions.116 
Article 29(1)(c) of the Courts of Justice Law provides that the 
applicable law in Cyprus is the common law and the principles of 
equity.117 However, the hybrid nature of the law is emphasized by 
the fact that the starting point for the development of judicially con-
structed rules is the codified legislation. The law of contract in Cy-
prus is contained in Chapter 149 of the Laws of Cyprus (also known 
as Cap. 149) originally enacted in 1957, which is effectively a trans-
plant of the Indian Contract Act of 1872.118 According to Hat-
zimihail, the primary differences between the two texts are tech-
nical: certain explanations were moved into the main text, illustra-
tions have been removed, and specific performance is provided for 
 
 113.  See Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L95) (EC), on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts [hereinafter Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive]. 
 114.  French law prohibits contractual clauses that create a significant imbal-
ance between the parties’ rights and obligations arising under a contract. This 
concept is defined by reference to lesion originating from consumer law—and 
was later extended to commercial law and to general contract law with the French 
revision of obligations by Ordinance no. 2016-131, Feb. 10, 2016. See also David 
R. Amariles, Eva M. Bassilana & Matteo Winkler, The Impact of the French Doc-
trine of Significant Imbalance on International Business Transactions, 2 J. BUS. 
L. 149 (2018). 
 115.  See Yam Seng Pte Ltd. v. International Trade Corp. Ltd. (2013) EWHC 
111 (QB). See to that effect, Ewan McKendrick, Doctrine and Discretion in the 
Law of Contract Revisited, 7 CHIN. J. COMP. L. 1 (2019). 
 116.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 228. 
 117.  See Constantinou v. Panayides (1984) 1 C.L.R. 466; it was clarified that 
the common law finds application in Cyprus in light of the provisions of the 
Courts of Justice Law. The court explained that the common law without the 
amendments by English statute was applicable. 
 118.  L. 24/30 Laws of Cyprus at Chapter 149, Contract [hereinafter Cap. 149]. 
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in Cyprus contract law.119 The most important difference has to do 
with the interpretation of the statute. In Cyprus, the statute is to be 
interpreted in accordance with the principles of legal interpretation 
obtained in England. Also, expressions used in a statute shall be pre-
sumed, so far as it is consistent with their context, to be used with 
the meaning attached to them in English law.120 It should be pointed 
out, nonetheless, that certain provisions were read by Cyprus courts 
(unlike Indian courts) as deviating from the common law.121 
In Pastella Marine v. Iranian Tanker,122 the court noted that in 
interpreting a statute it may resort to English authorities interpreting 
English analogous statutes. However, for the purposes of the case, 
and since a comparison of the text of section 30 of The Merchant 
Shipping (Registration of Ships Sales and Mortgages) Law123 re-
vealed notable differences between the wording of the Cyprus and 
the English enactments, little or no assistance could be derived from 
English case law affecting the interpretation of said section. In 
Sekavin S.A. v. Ship “PlatonCh,”124 it was stipulated that article 70 
of the Contract Law reproduces common law in respect of quasi 
contractual liability of recipient of goods or services supplied or ren-
dered not gratuitously. According to the court, in Saab and Another 
v. Holy Monastery of Ayios Neophytos,125 Cap. 149, article 73 aims 
to reproduce the common law rules on damages for breach of con-
tract as they crystallized and were fashioned in the case of Hadley 
 
 119.  Hatzimihail, supra note 55, at 75-99. See also Shivprasad Swaminathan, 
The Will Theorist’s Mailbox: Misunderstanding the Moment of Contract For-
mation in the Indian Contract Act, 1872, 39 STAT. L. REV. (2018). 
 120.  Cap. 149, supra note 118, at art. 2(1). 
 121.  Myrianthousis v. Petrou (1956) 21 C.L.R. 32 (on past consideration); 
Maison Jenny Ltd. v. Krashias Footwear Industry Ltd. (2002) 1 C.L.R. 1156 (on 
frustration). 
 122.  Pastella Marine v. Iranian Tanker (1987) 1 C.L.R. 583. 
 123.  The Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships, Sales and Mortgages) 
Law no. 45/1963. 
 124.  Sekavin S.A. v. Ship “PlatonCh” (1987) 1 C.L.R. 297 [hereinafter 
Sekavin]. 
 125.  Saab and Another v. Holy Monastery of Ayios Neophytos (1982) 1 
C.L.R. 499. 
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v. Baxendale.126 Damages, therefore, aim to restore the party to the 
position he would be but for the breach.127  
The law provides that all agreements are contracts if they are 
made by the free consent of the parties competent to contract for a 
lawful consideration and for a lawful object, but two or more per-
sons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the 
same sense (meeting of the minds). Non-performance of a contract 
is governed by the doctrine of breach of contract, by providing dam-
ages, specific performance and injunctions, and the doctrine of im-
possibility of performance due to an unintentional weakness, where 
frustration is the only cause for justifying non-performance. Cap. 
149, article 29 states the following: “Agreements, the meaning of 
which is not certain, or capable of being made certain, are void.” 
According to the court,128 this incorporates the common law rule 
that only agreements with terms that are certain are enforceable in 
law. Thus, the ingredients of a valid contract as listed in Horrocks 
v. Forray129 apply, namely:  
a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties; 
reasonable certainty as to the terms of the contract, the essential 
terms of the contract must be clearly made out; 
the agreement must be accompanied by an intention to affect le-
gal relations of the contracting parties; and 
there must be consideration moving from the promisee. 
The hold on the common law in contract and commercial law in 
Cyprus may be explained by the search for the most efficient rules 
 
 126.  See Hadley v. Baxendale (1843-60) All E.R. Rep. 461. The judgment 
sets the rule that if two parties make a contract, and one of them breaches it, the 
damages that the other party ought to receive regarding this breach of contract 
should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered. Such damages arise 
either naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from the breach of 
contract itself, or are the probable result of the breach as contemplated by both 
parties. 
 127.  See C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos (The Heron II) (1967) 3 All E.R 686 
(H.L.); Soleada S.A. v. Hamoor Tanker Corporation Inc. (1981) 1 All E.R. 856 
(C.A.). 
 128.  Sekavin, supra note 124. 
 129.  Horrocks v. Forray (1976) 1 All E.R. 737. 
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that favor today’s market economy. Cyprus’ contract and commer-
cial law—as opposed to non-commercial civil matters that have 
been under civilian influence—is a reaffirmation that in mixed ju-
risdictions commercial law [mainly] and in certain cases contract 
law follows the dominant economy rather than the dominant cul-
ture.130 “Pockets of resistance” to the common law influence in pri-
vate law have been expanded or created, as the transplantation of 
Greek family law indicates.131 Another such example is the trans-
plantation of Greek law with regards to the Associations and Foun-
dations Act, which governs non-profit institutions.132 
III. THE IMPACT OF EU LAW 
EU membership created a lot of hopes both in terms of reunifi-
cation of the territorially divided island and mainly in terms of fa-
cilitating the reform of the basic institutions thereby considered as 
an impetus for change. After accession in 2004, the Constitution was 
amended introducing a Europe provision on the model of article 
29(4)(6) of the Irish Constitution, with the aim of overriding with 
this general article all the specific incompatibilities existing between 
other articles of the Constitution and the obligations of Cyprus as a 
member of the EU. Under article 1A of the Constitution and 179,133 
supremacy is given to EU law. Also, under article 169.3 of the Con-
stitution, International Treaties, Conventions, and Agreements have 
a superior force of law based on reciprocity. In essence, the Consti-
tution precedes even the case law of the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union (CJEU), which never expressly held that the acts 
adopted under the Union’s third pillar—as it was at the time of the 
fifth constitutional amendment—had precedence over national con-
stitutional provisions.134 It basically embodies a total surrender to 
 
 130.  PALMER, supra note 13, at 56. 
 131.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 88, at 217. 
 132.  Law 57/72. 
 133.  As amended by Law 127(I)/2006, amend. 6. 
 134.  Lykourgos, supra note 76, at 104-5. 
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the supremacy of European law.135 This favorable, “pro-European 
approach” was a result of the difficulty to amend the Constitution 
and the will to render unnecessary any future amendment. Since in-
ternational legality and European integration are the basis for a fu-
ture reintegration of the divided island, the decision to adopt a “Eu-
rope provision” that gives prevalence to EU law over domestic 
therefore “come[s] as no surprise.”136 
Symeonides found a silver lining: prior comprehensive stream-
lining and modernization of Cyprus legislation was not undertaken 
as it avoided duplication with the harmonization project.137 None-
theless, the most common practice of EU derivative law implemen-
tation has been the transposition of the text of directives verbatim, 
with little effort at consolidation or integration with national legal 
structures.138 These texts are usually based on prototypes from 
Greece and the United Kingdom. This has led to arguments that the 
process of harmonization in Cyprus has led to an indirect rapproche-
ment with Greek law, endangering its common law elements. Hat-
zimihail notes that one can indeed find implementation legislation 
where a distinctive local touch was asserted.139 
In general, it is argued that the harmonization process reduces 
the differences between common law and continental law. For ex-
ample, Zimmermann argues that the idea of English common law as 
an autochthonous achievement is a myth140 and that it would have 
had the same direction and evolution regardless of the 
 
 135.  Christiana Markou, The Cyprus and Other EU Court Rulings on Data 
Retention: The Directive as a Privacy Bomb, 28 COMP. L. & SEC. REV. 474 
(2012). 
 136.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 53. 
 137.  Symeonides, supra note 24, at 454. 
 138.  See Hatzimihail, supra note 4, at 82. 
 139.  Id. (referring to CONSTANTINOS ILIOPOULOS, THE ACCESSION OF THE RE-
PUBLIC OF CYPRUS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE HARMONIZATION OF THE 
LAW OF COMPANIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPOERTY (A. Sakkoulas, 2006) (in 
Greek)). 
 140.  Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law and the Harmonisation of Private 
Law in Europe, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 34 (3d ed., Arthur S. Hart-
kamp, Ewoud H. Hondius, Carla Joustra, Edgar du Perron, Muriel Veldman & 
Martijn Hesselink eds., Kluwer Law Int’l 2004). 
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Europeanization of law. However, in Cyprus, the legal system 
would have been attached to a greater degree to the old common 
law, due to the tendency to withhold legal, institutional, and political 
reform indefinitely. Moreover, the relatively few publications writ-
ten on the legal system and the absence of a legal academia who can 
contribute to the doctrinal development of the system until very re-
cently implies that changes will be significantly bigger than in more 
developed systems.  
European law has affected the juristic outlooks of the Eng-
lish legal system. European law directives led to the adoption 
of continental reasoning, such as the principle of proportional-
ity, legitimate expectation, the use of teleological and purpos-
ive reasoning, and the principle of good faith.141 According to 
Margit Cohn, the Europeanization of British public law has 
been oblique and implied, with the unreasonableness doctrine 
retaining its unique nature in areas that have not been directly 
influenced by the external system. Proportionality has not 
reached a status of an overarching principle and it is only ap-
plied in European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) contexts. 
When it is applied, courts rely on Commonwealth sources ra-
ther than referencing its European origin.142 Therefore, the 
British administrative law shows resistance to the adoption of 
civil law constructs. On the contrary, most of these principles 
formed part of the legal system of Cyprus due to the predomi-
nance of civil law in public law matters. Greek legal thinking 
tends to look for the purpose and meaning of the statute, hence 
applying a teleological interpretation. Similarly, Cyprus judges 
employ the teleological interpretation more than their English 
colleagues, a clear example of the ability to adapt to the syn-
thetic blending of the two legal traditions of the West by 
 
 141.  PALMER, supra note 13, at 9. 
 142.  Margit Cohn, Pure or Mixed? The Evolution of Three Grounds of Judi-
cial Review of the Administration in British and Israeli Administrative Law, 6 J. 
COMP. L. 86 (2012). 
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generating what is called as metamorphosis or creation of autono-
mous law.143 
At the same time, it is argued that little of the substance of 
English contract law has changed directly as a result of mem-
bership in the EU.144 The most impactful EU legislative meas-
ure upon English contract law is the Directive on Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts.145 According to Catherine MacMillan, 
the good faith concept has posed a considerable challenge in 
its orientation in a body of law largely premised upon caveat 
emptor and a strong orientation towards freedom of contract.146 
Since English contract law has developed around the concept 
of caveat emptor, tension arises between this principle and 
good faith.147 MacMillan argues that this tension is evident in 
the case of Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National plc,148 
which arguably shows that U.K. courts have not embraced the 
European approach to fairness.149 The court examined the fair-
ness of bank charges for unauthorized overdrafts. It held that 
the charges were excluded from review because they were not 
the prices paid in exchange for the transactions in question, but 
they were monetary considerations related to the package of 
banking services supplied to current account customers. This 
means that the charges were part of the price or remuneration 
paid by the customer in exchange for the package of services, 
falling within the notion of the “main subject matter of the 
 
 143.  PALMER, supra note 13, at 71. The so-called sui generis norms of mixed 
jurisdictions come as a result of a process of mingling common law and civil law 
elements. The teleological approach was followed even in cases of interpretation 
of a contract. 
 144.  Catherine MacMillan, The Impact of Brexit upon English Contract Law, 
27 KING’S L. J. 426 (2016). 
 145.  Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, supra note 113. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 427. 
 148.  Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National PLC (2010) 1 A.C. 696, Su-
preme Court [hereinafter Office of Fair Trading]. 
 149.  Geraint G. Howells, The European Union’s Influence on English Con-
sumer Contract Law, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1904 (2017). 
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contract” and thus not subject to review for unfairness. Lord 
Mance in his deliberation highlighted that: 
there is no basis for requiring [the court to read and interpret 
the contract] by attempting to identify a ‘typical consumer’ 
or by confining the focus to matters on which it might con-
jecture that he or she would be likely to focus. The con-
sumer’s protection under the Directive and Regulations is 
the requirement of transparency . . . .150 
This conclusion is criticized as being at odds with the European 
notion of the average consumer and it follows the general assump-
tion that the common law emphasizes laissez-faire values, which 
goes against the EU’s general fairness test (assumed to have a pro-
tective ethic).151 Whereas there have been cases where a duty of 
good faith was recognized as an implied term within the contract,152 
it is still not possible to consider this as a shift towards the continen-
tal use of the concept, which is now less likely to take place given 
the withdrawal of the U.K. from the EU.153 This tension is also ap-
parent in the case of Cyprus, while the approach of the courts is 
stricter than the one evident in the U.K.154 
However, as Geraint Howells points out, the assumption that the 
common law emphasizes laissez-faire values that may sit uneasily 
with the EU’s general fairness test, assumed to have a protective 
ethic, should be a cautious one since English as well as German law 
are also seen as more open to intervention compared to France and 
Italy who were reluctant to challenge unfair terms as their states 
were heavily involved as suppliers.155 Therefore, he rightly argues 
 
 150.  See Office of Fair Trading, supra note 148, § 113 (emphasis added). 
 151.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1908, 1934. 
 152.  See recent judgment in Bates and others v. Post Office Ltd., Judgment 
no. 3 (2009) EWHC 606 (QB). 
 153.  Mariana Pargendler, The Role of the State in Contract Law: The Com-
mon-Civil Law Divide, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 143, 152 (2018). 
 154.  See Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, supra note 113; in 
Cyprus, the fairness test provided under this directive was limited to the search 
for bad faith or undue influence in agreeing upon the terms of the contract. 
 155.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1908 (referring to Leone Niglia’s con-
clusion in THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONTRACT IN EUROPE (Kluwer Law Int’l 
2002)). 
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that the debate might be better viewed as one between business and 
consumer interests rather than one between legal cultures.156 Truth 
lies in the middle and, as Howells indicates, there has been a variety 
of approaches as to the assessment of fairness by English judges, 
some embracing a more protective ethic and others a self-inter-
est/self-reliant perspective.157 Howells argues that: “It may be too 
easy to typecast the common law as more laissez-faire than civilian 
regimes and jump on particular judgments as evidence of a return to 
form.”158 
Nevertheless, and despite the willingness of Cypriots to partake 
in European law, at least in the realm of contract law, Cyprus courts 
have been resistant to outside influences; challenging the idea that 
mixed legal systems are more receptive to outside influences.159 The 
harmonization process in Cyprus has shown that the combined pro-
ject of harmonization and modernization was not realized. The 
scope of change effected through European integration in general 
and the Europeanization of private law in particular are only gradu-
ally realized. Furthermore, the response of the courts towards Euro-
pean principles was one of irritation as Teubner suggests regarding 
the reception of good faith by British courts.160 The following anal-
ysis will examine the reception of the Unfair Contract Terms 
 
 156.  Id. at 1950. 
 157.  Id. at 1948 (referring to Willet’s distinction), see Chris Willett, General 
Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK, 71 
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 412 (2012). The open-textured nature of general clauses of fair-
ness that EU law provides can be subject to interpretation by reference to some 
background ethic, what Chris Willett calls: “some vision of the ideal market and 
civil order.” This gives rise to two competing ethics, namely one based on values 
of trader self-interest and consumer self-reliance, and another that aims to sub-
stantively protect the consumers against the weaknesses that they suffer relatively 
to traders. The ethic of self-interest/reliance is closest to freedom of contract 
thinking and the approach of the common law courts; while the protective ethic 
prioritizes consumer protection from the financial and social impact of ‘harsh’ 
terms and practices and is closer to the continental approach. 
 158.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1948. 
 159.  Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, “Say Not the Struggle Naught Availeth”: The 
Costs and Benefits of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 433 (2003) (opposing 
the change towards more European unity, which he sees as a threat to the value of 
mixed legal systems). 
 160.  Teubner, supra note 91. 
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Directive within the legal system of Cyprus by first presenting the 
framework for consumer protection. 
IV. CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER CYPRUS LAW 
As with other EU member states, Cyprus did not provide for 
consumer protection through statutory law or caselaw until the 
adoption of EU directives in the field. Consumers, therefore, had to 
resort to the general principles of private law in order to protect their 
interests.161 Cap 149 did not provide the necessary tools in dealing 
with unfair contract terms. Therefore, the implementation of the Un-
fair Contract Terms Directive covered a legal vacuum by providing 
for the judicial control of unfair terms in consumer contracts. Addi-
tionally, Cyprus did not follow the enactment of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act of 1977 (Chapter 50) in England, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland. The 1977 Act imposed limits on the extent to which the law 
allowed the avoidance of civil liability for breach of contract, or for 
negligence or other breach of duty by means of contract terms and 
otherwise. Thus, it conferred a substantial degree of discretion upon 
a court in finding a particular exclusion or limitation clause to be 
unreasonable. Consequently, the absence of similar statutory devel-
opments in Cyprus meant that judicial discretion in contractual mat-
ters was limited, with the courts having little interest in interfering 
with the terms of the contract.  
The beginnings of consumer protection in Cyprus may be found 
in the case of Cyprus Wine Association Ltd. v. Theodossis Geor-
ghiou,162 a consumer suffered a wine-cork injury to his left eye. The 
trial court in delivering its judgment in favor of the consumer relied 
on the English common law principle expounded in the case of Do-
noghue v. Stevenson163 where Lord Atkin stated that: 
 
 161.  EVRIPIDES HATZINESTOROS & GIORGOS CHARALAMBOUS, THE LAW ON 
THE SALE OF GOODS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN CYPRUS 316 (Nomiki Bib-
liothiki 2016) (in Greek). 
 162.  Cyprus Wine Association Ltd. v. Theodossis Georghiou (1970) 1 C.L.R. 
246. 
 163.  Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) A.C. 562. 
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a manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as 
to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer 
in the form in which they left him with no reasonable possi-
bility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge 
that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or put-
ting up of the products will result in an injury to the con-
sumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take 
that reasonable care. 
Further, the court stated that if liability is based on the principle 
stipulated in Donoghue, there must be evidence of negligence, 
though slight evidence may suffice.164 The Supreme Court on appeal 
held that the appellants were not guilty of want of reasonable care 
since the trial court erred in not weighing properly witness evidence. 
It also held that the trial court misinterpreted the legal effect of the 
Grant case regarding the level of evidence that must be provided in 
order to show negligence. The court’s use of general principles of 
negligence and its reference to a duty of reasonable care that manu-
facturers owe towards both consumers and purchasers of products 
in general was the first line of protection offered by the system for 
injuries caused by such products. However, the standard of proof in 
this case was the balance of probabilities, specifically the con-
sumer/purchaser had to show that the method of manufacture of the 
good in question was faulty and that his personal injuries were 
caused by the negligence of the manufacturer.  
This element is also seen in the cases following the financial cri-
sis (2013) where debtors accused creditors of breaching their duty 
of care.165 However, EU law provides for the relaxation of the bur-
den of proof in favor of the consumer.166 This relaxation, according 
 
 164.  See Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd. (1936) A.C. 85. 
 165.  Syrimi v. Pancyprian Funding Agency Ltd. (2010) 1 C.L.R. 1131 [here-
inafter Syrimi]; Gregoriou v. Euroinvestment & Finance Ltd. (2011) 1 C.L.R. 
2229. 
 166.  See art. 5(3) of Directive 1999/44 that provides for a derogation from the 
principle set forth in art. 3(1) that stipulates that the seller is to be liable for any 
lack of conformity which exists at the time the goods were delivered. The dero-
gation refers to the lack of conformity becoming apparent within six months of 
delivery of the goods, that is presumed to have existed at the time of delivery. 
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to the CJEU in Froukje Faber v. Autobedrijf Hazet Ochten BV, is 
based on: 
the determination that where the lack of conformity becomes 
apparent only subsequent to the time of delivery of the 
goods, it is ‘well-nigh impossible for consumers’ to prove 
that the lack of conformity existed at the time of delivery, 
whereas it is generally far easier for the professional to 
demonstrate that the lack of conformity was not present at 
the time of delivery and that it resulted, for example, from 
improper handling by the consumer.167 
For the consumer to benefit from the relaxation of the burden of 
proof, he must furnish evidence of certain facts. The consumer must 
show that the goods sold are not in conformity with the contract, 
insofar as they do not have the qualities agreed or are not fit for the 
purpose. However, the consumer is not required to establish that the 
origin of the malfunction is attributable to the seller. Also, the con-
sumer must prove that the lack of conformity became apparent phys-
ically within six months of delivery of the goods. The occurrence of 
the lack of conformity within six months makes it possible to as-
sume that it existed “in embryonic form in those goods at the time 
of delivery.”168 
The case before the Supreme Court of Cyprus indicates that the 
standard of proof is higher for the consumer, since even if the re-
spondents managed to show that the appellants (as a matter of infer-
ence) were negligent, the manufacturers adduced reliable evidence 
to rebut the inference of negligence. Therefore, even though the 
 
 167.  Case C-497/13, Froukje Faber v. Autobedrijf Hazet Ochten BV, 2015 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:357 § 54. Directive 1999/44 offers the possibility to the con-
sumer, in order to benefit from his rights, to inform the seller of the lack of con-
formity within a period of two months from the date on which he detected such 
lack of conformity. This option reflects the aim of reinforcing legal certainty, ac-
cording to the travaux préparatoires, by encouraging diligence on the part of the 
purchaser taking the seller’s interests into account but does not establish a strict 
obligation to carry out a detailed inspection of the good. The court explains that 
the obligation does not establish a requirement for the consumer to furnish evi-
dence that the lack of conformity actually adversely affects the goods or to state 
the precise cause of that lack of conformity. 
 168.  Case C-497/13, Froukje Faber v. Autobedrijf Hazet Ochten BV, 2015 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:357 § 72. 
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appellants/manufacturers were aware that the wine being fermented 
could cause the wine-cork to pop out the container, this possibility 
in view of the evidence was estimated at 1%. Judge Hadjiana-
stassiou noted that he was not persuaded that the cork had to be fas-
tened by a wire or that there should be a warning on the demijohn to 
address the risks of fermentation. The judge also noted that, in this 
case, the manufacturer could not foresee that there was a reasonable 
probability of fermentation to necessitate an express warning. 
A more recent decision indicates the tendency of the courts to 
place the burden of proving whether a product is secure upon the 
shoulders of the plaintiff/consumer. This makes it difficult to prove 
since, depending on the nature of the product, expert testimony may 
be required.169 In the case of Tsiattes v. Kokis Solomonides (Car-
tridges Industries) Ltd.,170 the appellant requested damages for hear-
ing injuries that were caused by the detonation of the right barrel of 
his shotgun during a hunting excursion. The appellant argued that 
the underlying cause of the accident was the defective cartridge pur-
chased from the respondents/defendants who maintained a cartridge 
manufacturing plant and a retail outlet. The Supreme Court held that 
the appellant failed to provide evidence that the detonation of the 
barrel was the result of the deficient cartridge. According to the 
court, the trial court was correct in holding that the appellant failed 
to prove causation between the incident and the cartridge. 
After the accident, the appellant referred to the seller of the shot-
gun who in turn sent the shotgun to the manufacturer in Spain. Ac-
cording to the manufacturer, there are two possible causes for the 
accident: the presence of a foreign object in the barrel or the high 
pressure from the cartridge. The manufacturer suggested that the 
gun ought to be sent to a weapons proofing establishment in Spain, 
in which case the company would have considered its conclusions 
acceptable. Instead, the appellant preferred to send the gun to the 
 
 169.  HATZINESTOROS & CHARALAMBOUS, supra note 161, at 403. 
 170.  Tsiattes v. Kokis Solomonides (Cartridges Industries) Ltd. (2009) 1 
C.L.R. 974. 
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Birmingham Gun Barrel Proof House located in the U.K. After a 
metallurgical test that indicated that the gun did not suffer from a 
structural defect and that its barrel was cracked as a result of its pro-
longed use, the weapons proofing establishment reached the conclu-
sion that the detonation was caused by the high pressure in the bar-
rel. However, it did not indicate whether it was the cartridge to 
blame or another cause.  
For the defendants, the owners of the company provided testi-
mony relating to the manufacturing cartridges. The owners ex-
plained that they utilized state-of-the-art equipment, that their car-
tridges were amongst the best in Europe, and that the company met 
ISO 9002 standards. The trial court accepted their testimony as they 
were regarded as experts in the field. But the report by the Birming-
ham Gun Barrel Proof House was not considered because the author 
of the report was not present as a witness and it, therefore, amounted 
to hearsay evidence (based on the applicable law at the moment of 
judgment). Thus, the judge of first instance held that the principle of 
res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to the facts of the case and that 
there was no causation between the incident and the damage in-
flicted. It also did not find that the injury was the result of a defective 
cartridge and therefore did not find that the defendant was negligent.  
The Supreme Court stated that the crucial issue to be dealt with 
was the question of the burden of proof. The appellant had the bur-
den of proving the defectiveness of the cartridge. His failure to save 
the last cartridge that he used was seen as a hinderance for a proper 
examination. At the same time the court noted that no evidence was 
provided either by expert testimony or otherwise as to the cartridge, 
but only presumptions as to the possible cause of the accident. 
Consumer protection in Cyprus is only at early stages even after 
the adoption of the EU Directives. The courts still resort to the gen-
eral principles of contract law when dealing with issues of consumer 
protection. This leads to fragmentation since sectorial regulators 
such as the Financial Ombudsman have ruled differently from the 
courts in similar cases, when arguably applying the same principles. 
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The consumer acquis of the EU applies to particular types of con-
tract such as timeshare contracts, package travel, and contracts of 
consumer credit and is, therefore, piecemeal, furthering such frag-
mentation in the law. Consequently, the EU consumer acquis lacks 
an overarching principle or set of principles since it is governed by 
special sets of rules.171 The good faith requirement, therefore, does 
not have the same weight as in civilian legal systems. However, such 
legal systems have been more willing and prepared to realize the set 
of rules provided under EU law.  
Simon Whittaker emphasizes that this lack of general principles 
safeguards against the risk of clash with existing general principles 
of municipal laws. However, the absence of principles makes the 
implemented legislation appear exceptionally uncoordinated and 
difficult to place.172 Legal systems that do not recognize a general 
norm of good faith or fairness governing contracts, as is the case 
with English and Cyprus contract law, create tension between tradi-
tional contract law and policing/regulatory law since the require-
ment appears to apply only to the latter. Thus, one may conclude 
that the availability of the requirement only for policing measures 
may result in its extension for purposes of traditional contract law.173 
As is seen from the experience of Cyprus, this has not been the sit-
uation in contrast to certain cases before English courts where good 
faith was recognized as an implied term. The Director of the Con-
sumer Protection Service, however, took the view that the content 
of the requirement of good faith is identical to the one adopted in 
civilian systems such as Greece and Germany and has consequently 
applied the requirement by citing rulings of Greek and German 
courts.174 
 
 171.  Simon Whittaker, Form and Substance in the Reception of EC Directives 
into English Contract Law, 4 EUR. R. CONT. L. 389 (2007). 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Decision of the Republic of Cyprus Consumer Protection Service 
2018/1, Dossier No. 8.13.10.26.4.4.1 and 8.13.10.26.4.4.9. The Director referred 
to a German Highest Court decision where it was decided that burdening the con-
sumer with the supplier’s management costs was contrary to good faith and 
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A. The Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive directly affects the sub-
stance of all contracts concluded between a consumer and a supplier. 
Directive 93/13 is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak 
position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, regarding both his bargain-
ing power and his level of knowledge.175 “In view of that weak po-
sition, Directive 93/13 prohibits, . . . in Article 3(1), standard terms 
which, contrary to the requirement of good faith, cause a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the 
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”176 Article 3(1) of the 
Directive specifically refers to “[a] contractual term which has not 
been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair . . . .”177 
As per article 3(2), the burden of proving that the term was indi-
vidually negotiated lies on the seller/supplier. Also, article 4(2) pro-
vides that: 
Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate nei-
ther to the definition of the main subject matter of the con-
tract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on 
the one hand, as against the services or goods supplies in ex-
change, on the other, in so far as these terms are in plain in-
telligible language.178 
Non-negotiated terms that fail the standard of fairness of 
Directive 93/13 are rendered ineffective. It is for the national 
court to check the fairness of the terms by taking account of all 
the circumstances of the case including the nature of the goods 
or services for which the contract was concluded.179 The CJEU 
 
fundamental principles of contract law. See BUNDESGERICHTHOF [BGH] [Federal 
Court of Justice], July 06, 2011, XZR 388/10. See also Decision of the Republic 
of Cyprus Consumer Protection Service 2017/9, Dossier No. 8.13.10.26.4.5.1. 
 175.  C-119/15, Biuro podrozy Partner (2016) EU:C:2016:987, § 28. 
 176.  C-92/11, RWE Vertrieb (2013) EU:C:2013:180, § 42. 
 177.  See Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, supra note 113, at 
art. 3(1). 
 178.  Id. at art. 4(2). 
 179.  C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Taragona I 
Manresa ECLI:EU:C:2013:164, § 71 [hereinafter Aziz]. 
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noted that supreme courts of member states in their role of ensuring 
consistency in the interpretation of the law and in the interests of 
legal certainty may elaborate certain criteria in the light of which the 
lower courts must examine the unfairness of contractual terms.180 
The Directive combines rules governing contract law in the 
more traditional sense; hence, the rules governing the mutual rights 
and obligations of parties to a contract, with a requirement for the 
creation of policing measures of a regulatory nature, aiming at the 
cessation of certain types of undesirable market behaviour by con-
tracting parties.181 The good faith requirement of the Directive pro-
vides for the assessment of the majority of terms found in consumer 
contracts to be subject to the fairness test. The fairness test, however, 
has a certain degree of ambiguity as far as its content is con-
cerned.182  
The Directive, thus, sets two core requirements for a finding of 
a term as unfair in addition to the detriment suffered by the con-
sumer: the existence of a significant imbalance between the parties 
and it being contrary to good faith.183 Nevertheless, it is not entirely 
clear whether these two elements of significant imbalance and good 
faith need to be shown separately and cumulatively in all circum-
stances. According to Anne-Lise Sibony, the drafting suggests that 
a grossly imbalanced contract is due to such imbalance, contrary to 
good faith.184 The requirement of significant imbalance may be in-
terpreted as an indication of substantive unfairness.185 The CJEU 
held in Aziz, that: 
[I]n order to ascertain whether a term causes a ‘significant 
imbalance’ in the parties’ rights and obligations arising 
 
 180.  Joined Cases C-96/16 and C-94/17, Banco Santander SA v. Mahamadou 
Demba, 2018 ECLI:EU:C:2018:643 § 78. 
 181.  Whittaker, supra note 171, at 385. 
 182.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1913. 
 183.  Id. at 1916. 
 184.  Anne-Lise Sibony, European Unfairness and American Unconscionabil-
ity: A Letter From a European Lawyer to American Friends, 15 EUR. REV. C. L. 
195, 204 (2019). 
 185.  See Howells, supra note 149, 1916. 
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under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer, it must 
in particular be considered what rules of national law would 
apply in the absence of an agreement by the parties in that 
regard. Such a comparative analysis will enable the national 
court to evaluate whether and, as the case may be, to what 
extent, the contract places the consumer in a legal situation 
less favourable than that provided for by the national law in 
force. To that end, an assessment should also be carried out 
of the legal situation of that consumer having regard to the 
means at his disposal, under national legislation, to prevent 
continued use of unfair terms.186 
Accordingly, this interpretation was regarded as fitting the Ger-
man approach under which the assessment is made against default 
rules.187 The concept of “significant imbalance” in rights and obli-
gations is broadly accepted as referring to substantive features of the 
terms.188 This reflects various national traditions and understandings 
of the test, according to Chris Willett, and implies that terms are 
contrary to the test when they allocate the substantive rights and ob-
ligations in ways that are unduly detrimental to the consumer by, for 
example, adding to the responsibilities of the consumer when com-
pared with the responsibilities under the legal default position.189 
The second core requirement of good faith is linked to the estab-
lishment of a significant imbalance.190 According to one interpreta-
tion of the Directive, the good faith requirement does not have a 
supplementary role that is added to the criterion of “significant im-
balance” but it rather only adds to the decade long national caselaw 
and doctrine developed in the majority of the member states.191 
Thus, it is only a means of explaining the concept of significant im-
balance in the countries where the principle of good faith applies. A 
 
 186.  See Aziz, supra note 179, § 68. 
 187.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1917. 
 188.  Chris Willett, The Functions of Transparency in Regulating Contract 
Terms: UK and Australian Approaches, 60 INT. COMP. L. Q. 355, 363 (2011); 
Hugh Collins, Good Faith in European Contract Law, 14 OXFORD J.LEGAL. 
STUD. 229, 249 (1994). 
 189.  Id. at 363. 
 190.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1918. 
 191.  Mário Tenreiro, The Community Directive on Unfair Terms and National 
Legal Systems, 3 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 273, 279 (1995). 
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term is always regarded as contrary to the requirement of good faith 
when it causes such an imbalance, based on this view. According to 
Willett, however, the fact that Recital 16 provides that the assess-
ment is to be supplemented by various criteria that are germane to 
good faith is an indication that violation of good faith is an inde-
pendent requirement.192 While good faith is a creature of civilian 
tradition, the concept must be given an autonomous European inter-
pretation.193 Recital 16 of the preamble to the Directive provides 
that: 
[I]n making an assessment of good faith, particular regard 
shall be had to the strength of the bargaining positions of the 
parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to 
the term and whether the goods or services were sold or sup-
plied to the special order of the consumer . . . .194 
 Also, in Aziz, the CJEU stated that:  
With regard to the question of the circumstances in which an 
imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’ 
. . . the national court must assess . . . whether the seller or 
supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, 
could reasonably assume that the consumer would have 
agreed to such a term in individual contract negotiations.195 
 This, according to Howells, places substantive limits on contrac-
tual freedom, beyond the procedural controls, clearly forcing com-
mon lawyers to think beyond their traditional understanding of fair-
ness.196 
The terms that are not assessable for their fairness are terms that de-
scribe the main subject matter of the contract or the quality/price ratio of 
the goods or services supplied.197 German academic criticism was the re-
sult of this exception since it was seen as a drastic restriction of the 
 
 192.  Willett, supra note 188, at 364. 
 193.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1921. 
 194.  See Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, supra note 113, at 
recital no. 16. 
 195.  Aziz, supra note 179, § 69. 
 196.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1919. 
 197.  See Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, supra note 113, at 
recital no. 19. 
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autonomy of the individual.198 This distinction between core and ancillary 
terms is more familiar to civil lawyers.199 According to Anne de Moor, 
the distinction between main (or principal) and subsidiary contractual ob-
ligations that can be drawn in civil law, is not as readily available to com-
mon law courts.200 This has particular repercussions since common 
law courts may find that article 6(1) of the Directive—which pro-
vides that “unfair terms . . . shall . . . not be binding on the consumer 
and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those 
terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair 
terms” (“severance”)—is an “illegitimate exercise in ‘rewriting of 
the contract.’”201 
The CJEU has also used the concept of “plain and intelligible 
language” in order to ensure a high level of consumer protection.202 
Article 5 provides that the terms must always “be drafted in plain, 
intelligible language” and “[w]here there is doubt about the meaning 
of a term, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall 
prevail.” Recital 19 specifies that consumers should be given an op-
portunity to examine all the terms. In case that terms that relate to 
the main subject matter of the contract are not in plain intelligible 
language, they are also subject to unfairness review as stated in ar-
ticle 4(2). In Kásler, the CJEU held that the concept requires that 
intelligibility is not restricted to mere formal or grammatical intelli-
gibility. Instead, the standard used to assess it is the “average con-
sumer, who is reasonably . . . observant and circumspect . . . .”203 
 
 198.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1928. See also Hans Erich Brandner & 
Peter Ulmer, The Community Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: 
Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal Submitted by the EC Commission, 28 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 647, 662 (1991). 
 199.  Howells, supra note 149, at 1928. See also Anne de Moor, Common and 
Civil Law Conceptions of Contract and a European Law of Contract: the Case of 
the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 3 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 257, 
268 (1995). 
 200.  See de Moor, supra note 199, at 268. 
 201.  Id. at 269. 
 202.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1936. 
 203.  C-26/13, Kásler and Rabai v. OTP Jelzalogbank Zrt, 2014 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 §§ 71-72, 74. 
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This accordingly was seen as rather protective of the average con-
sumer, since it required the consumer to be aware of the existence 
of the difference between the selling rate of exchange and the buying 
rate of exchange of a foreign currency. It also required the consumer 
to also be able to assess the potentially significant economic conse-
quences for him resulting from the application of the selling rate of 
exchange for the calculation of the repayments for which he would 
ultimately be liable (and the total cost of the sum borrowed).204 This 
concept of transparency, as de Moor highlights, was met with reser-
vation in English legal circles because of the common law concep-
tion of the contract as an exchange; whereby acceptance does not 
imply assenting to the offer but doing what the offeror requested or 
specified in return for the offer. By contrast, the continental law con-
ception of the contract is the meeting of minds or accord of wills.205 
The interpretation of intelligibility, as far as credit contracts are con-
cerned, poses challenges on the established rules on variation of in-
terest rate in credit contracts that can be found in the U.K. as well as 
other jurisdictions such as Cyprus.206 
European regulatory law, especially in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis (after 2008),207 introduced standards for increased disclosure, pro-
moted transparency, and to a certain extent enabled the retroactive modi-
fication of private contracts.208 In this environment, transparency enforc-
ing mechanisms have been extended as a result of the Unfair Contract 
 
 204.  Id. § 74. See also Howells, supra note 149, at 1938. 
 205.  See de Moor, supra note 199, at 262. 
 206.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1939. 
 207.  See C-308/17, Hellenische Republik v. Leo Kuhn (2018) 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:911 [hereinafter Hellenische Republik]. 
 208.  The information paradigm is predominant in EU law, see, e.g., C-788/79, 
Herbert Gilli v. Paul Andres ECLI:EU:C:1980:171, where the court took the view 
that consumers could be protected by labelling of a product. See also John A. 
Usher, Disclosure Rules (Information) as a Primary Tool in the Doctrine on 
Measures Having an Equivalent Effect, in PARTY AUTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF 
INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET (Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber 
& Stephen Weatherill eds., de Gruyter 2012). For the retroactive modification of 
private contracts, see Aziz, supra note 179, §§ 74-75. See also Amitai Aviram, 
Bail-Ins: Cyclical Effects of a Common Response to Financial Crises, 2011 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1633 (2011); and Shmuel Becher, Unintended Consequences and the 
Design of Consumer Protection Legislation, 93 TUL. L. REV. 105 (2018). 
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Terms Directive to dispute resolution agreements. In Verein für 
Konsumenteninformation v. Amazon EU Sàrl,209 the CJEU held 
that: 
[A] pre-formulated term on the choice of the applicable law 
designating the law of the Member State in which the seller 
or supplier is established is unfair only in so far as it displays 
certain specific characteristics inherent in its wording or con-
text which cause a significant imbalance in the rights and 
obligations of the parties.210 
The court highlighted that “the unfairness of such a term may 
result from a formulation that does not comply with the requirement 
of being drafted in plain and intelligible language set out in Article 
5 of Directive 93/13.”211 Finally, the court decided upon the term in 
question that was not individually negotiated and included in the 
general terms and conditions that it: 
[I]s unfair in so far as it leads the consumer into error by giv-
ing him the impression that only the law of that Member State 
applies to the contract, without informing him that . . . he also 
enjoys the protection of the mandatory provisions of the law 
that would be applicable in the absence of that term . . . .212 
The court elevated the principle of transparency as a formal re-
quirement determining the existence and material validity of the 
choice of law agreement in accordance with article 11 of Rome I. 
Advocate General Hogan realized the overreach of the transparency 
requirement in his recent opinion in C-34/18 where he stated that the 
Amazon judgment “somewhat overstated the scope of the ‘transpar-
ency requirement’ . . . .”213 The Advocate General argued that the 
court should revert to its previous approach, according to which 
 
 209.  C-191/15, Verein für Konsumenteninformation ECLI:EU:C:2016:612. 
 210.  Id. § 67. 
 211.  Id. § 68. 
 212.  Id. § 71. 
 213.  C-34/18, Ottília Lovasné Tóth v. Erste Bank Hungary Zrt (2019) 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:245, § 89. 
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article 5 of the Directive does not establish an autonomous test of 
unfairness which is distinct from that contained in article 3(1).214  
Finally, Article 7 of the Directive provides that member states 
shall ensure that “adequate and effective means exist to prevent the 
continued use of unfair terms in contracts . . . .”215 According to 
Whittaker, this provision has been implemented differently. In some 
cases, it allowed consumers’ association to bring proceedings for 
cessation. In other cases, it empowered public bodies to police unfair 
terms. It highlights the regulatory characteristics of the Directive 
since it aims at preventing future undesirable market behaviour. 
Whittaker argues that the Oceano Grupo Editorial SA v. Murciano 
Quintero216 decision is evidence that the CJEU considers the two 
types of intervention—that is, the rules governing contract law and 
rules aiming at regulating market behaviour—to be related. Specif-
ically, in deciding upon the power of a national court to rule on the 
unfairness of a contract term through its own motion, the court relied 
on the existence of article 7 as a preventative mechanism.217 Quali-
fied entities are empowered under EU law to ensure compliance 
with the consumer protection directives.218 
B. The Directive Before Cyprus Courts 
The Directive was implemented into law by the Unfair Contract 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Law in 1996 (also known as Law 
 
 214.  Interestingly, the Advocate General stated in § 99 that: “One might ask: 
is it to be seriously suggested as a result of the decision in Verein für Konsumen-
teninformation that consumers be given a summary of judicial decisions by po-
tential vendors prior to the conclusion of a consumer contract?” This comment is 
suggestive of the complexity of consumer law that is difficult to express in plain 
intelligible language. 
 215.  Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, supra note 113, at art. 7 
(emphasis added). 
 216.  Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat 
Editores (2000) E.C.R. I-4941. 
 217.  Whittaker, supra note 171, at 387. 
 218.  See Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
May 19, 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests. 
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93(I)/96),219 verbatim, except for recent amendments not derived 
from the Directive. The objective of the law is to safeguard the eco-
nomic interests of consumers from unfair contract terms included in 
contracts with suppliers or service providers and consumers. The di-
rector of the Consumer Protection Service has a duty to investigate 
upon submission of a complaint or ex officio whether a contractual 
term intended for general use is unfair. However, despite its adop-
tion in 1996, prior to Cyprus joining the EU, case law in courts only 
appeared in 2007.  
As noted by the Fitness Check Study rapporteur for Cyprus, case 
law, which is rather limited, reveals the gaps in understanding the 
philosophy and aim of the law both on the part of courts and lawyers 
representing consumers.220 Case law of the CJEU found no repre-
sentation in Cypriot case law until very recently. In fact, no court 
ruling existed until very recently where a thorough application of 
the principle-based approach of article 4(1) of the Directive takes 
place. The test was limited to the search for bad faith or undue in-
fluence (i.e., in the common law sense of absence of dishonesty) in 
agreeing upon the terms, as also noted above.221 
The CJEU held that it is for the national court to decide 
whether a contractual term satisfies the requirements of it to be 
regarded as unfair.222 Thus, the concept is not subject to legal 
definition or interpretation at neither the European nor national 
level and it is a factual issue to be decided based on an assess-
ment of the circumstances in each case. Lower courts in Cyprus 
limit the test to a reference stating that in the absence of an al-
legation that the consumer entered into the contract 
 
 219.  Law 93(I)/96. 
 220.  See Civic Consulting, European Commission, Study for the Fitness 
Check of EU Consumer and Marketing Law, Final report Part 3—Country re-
porting 207 (May 2017) [hereinafter Fitness Check Study]. 
 221.  Syrimi, supra note 165, is the precedent followed when applying the test 
provided under art. 4(1) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, 
supra note 113. 
 222.  C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. 
KG v. Ludger Hofstetter (2004) ECLI:EU:C:2004:209. 
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involuntarily, the law can afford the consumer no defence to 
claims by financial institutions, except for the terms on the black 
list.223 Other rulings of lower courts indicated that if the signa-
ture on the agreement is not disputed, the debtors are estopped 
from raising an issue of unfair contract terms.224 In Maria Nicolaou 
v. Ellinas Finance Ltd.,225 the court rejected the argument of the ap-
pellants about the unfairness of the terms of the loan agreement as a 
result of significant imbalance between the parties and the lack of 
individual negotiations of certain terms, as it was not convinced that 
such an imbalance and non-negotiation existed. Regarding a term 
that provided for twenty-four hours of notice before increasing the 
“margin of safety,” which could potentially be exploitative accord-
ing to the court, it was argued that the defendants did not apply said 
term to the detriment of the appellants.  
Courts tend to examine the unfairness of the contractual term 
notwithstanding the status of the contractual party as a consumer or 
a business. For example, in Euroinvestment & Finance v. Schiza,226 
the court examined the unfairness of a term notwithstanding the fact 
that the contract involved an investment agreement. The court ruled 
that the defendants claim over the unfairness of the terms were un-
founded since throughout the duration of the agreement they had the 
power to terminate the agreement based on the law of contracts and 
could have sold the shares in their portfolio. The court also exam-
ined the background of the defendants to note that it involved an 
experienced investor who was aware of the risks involved in the 
agreement. However, in I.S.G. Developers Ltd., S. Yurmanov v. 
Bank of Cyprus Public Company Ltd.,227 the court held that the Un-
fair Contract Terms Law did not apply in the facts of the case since 
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the claimants were not consumers, within the meaning of the law, as 
they were a legal rather than a natural person. The latter judgment 
signifies the shift in the understanding of the law. 
A few cases have come before courts with financial institutions 
requesting registration of an arbitration award and the consumers 
alleging unfairness of the arbitration clause. In Angeliki Taki Char-
alambous v. Cooperative Savings Bank Limassol,228 the applicants 
requested for the court to refer to the CJEU two preliminary ques-
tions dealing with the interpretation of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive. In particular, the applicants requested for the court to refer 
to the CJEU to decide whether the Directive is to be interpreted as 
meaning that a national court dealing with an appeal against an ar-
bitral award and assessing the invalidity or unfairness of an exclu-
sive arbitration clause contained in a contract can and/or has to take 
into account and/or assess the fact that the consumer has not been 
heard and had no involvement in the selection of the arbitrator and, 
hence, rule the arbitration clause as unfair. Furthermore, the appli-
cants requested for the court to refer the following question: Should 
the Directive be interpreted as meaning that a court that deals with 
an appeal against an arbitration award and assesses the invalidity 
and/or unfairness of an exclusive arbitration clause contained in a 
contract may and/or has to assess and take into account that article 
52(a) of the Cooperative Societies Law—which is the legal basis for 
the arbitration clause—was amended; leaving unaffected the right 
of the consumer to resort to a competent civil court instead of opting 
for arbitration, which was absent from the arbitration clause in ques-
tion, and hence hold said clause as unfair?  
As provided under article 34A(1) of Law 14/60, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the request did not meet the condition governing 
such referrals to the CJEU. Article 34A(1) provides the following: a 
court when dealing with a question of EU law interpretation, which 
 
 228.  Angeliki Taki Charalambous v. Cooperative Savings Bank Limassol 
(2016) joined apps. 115/13, 114/13, 363/13. 
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emerges in the case before it may request for a preliminary ruling as 
to the issue by the CJEU, if the court deems such a referral neces-
sary. The court, thus, found that the reference for preliminary ruling 
was not necessary, citing its own case law in Cypra Ltd. v. Republic 
of Cyprus, where it was held that, under article 267 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), only the CJEU has 
power to interpret EU law and did not apply the law in the circum-
stances of the case. The function of the preliminary ruling mecha-
nism, according to the judgment, is “essential for the preservation of 
the Community character of the law established by the Treaty and 
has the object of ensuring that in all circumstances this law is the 
same in all States of the Community.”229 According to the decision 
in Charalambous v. Cooperative Savings Bank Limassol, the CJEU 
decides over issues of interpretation and validity of EU law and not 
over the compatibility of national law with the former. The CJEU 
does have jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the ele-
ments of interpretation of EU law to enable it to assess the compat-
ibility for the purpose of deciding the case before it.230 In the facts 
of the case, the court found no ambiguity as to the interpretation of 
EU law that would render a preliminary request necessary. 
The decision in Alpha Bank Cyprus Ltd. v. Martin Miller et al. 
provides for the way by which the courts should approach questions 
about the unfairness of terms in credit contracts.231 In this case, the 
court made a declaratory judgment that modified the contract by 
eliminating the unfair terms that existed. In doing so, the court re-
jected both claimants’ and defendants’ claims for remedies. It is a 
unique judgment, in that no other judgment deals to the same extent 
with similar questions of unfairness of terms. However, one may 
notice similarities with the approach taken in previous caselaw. 
 
 229.  C-166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v. EVGF (1974) E.C.R. 33. 
 230.  See C-369/89, Piageme v. BVBA Peelers (1991) E.C.R. 1-2971, § 7. 
 231.  Alpha Bank Cyprus Ltd v. Martin Miller et al. (2017) app. no. 2014/2008 
[hereinafter Alpha Bank]. 
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Nevertheless, it is a judgment from a court of first instance and has 
no force of precedent. 
The case involved a mortgage contract between the claim-
ants/creditors and the defendants/debtors. The defendants chal-
lenged the right of the claimant to unilaterally set the interest rate as 
well as the rate itself. They argued that the claimants should have 
provided them legal consultation through an independent lawyer for 
the terms of the loan as well as the rates to be sufficiently explained. 
The right of the claimants to unilaterally terminate the defendants’ 
account was also challenged. The defendants also challenged the 
constitutionality of the Liberalization of Interest Law232 and the dis-
harmony of certain provisions with EU derivative law. Section 3(5) 
of Law 93(I)/96  provides that it is incumbent on the seller to prove 
that a standard term has been individually negotiated. Also, section 
3(1)(b) of the Liberalization of Interest Law provides that the impo-
sition of increased interest on late payment creates a plausible pre-
sumption for the credit institution that has the burden of proving that 
the default interest charged on late payments represents its actual 
loss. 
An extensive part of the decision is dedicated to the witness 
testimonies and their evaluation. A part of the cross-examination 
dealt with the fact that the document of the loan commitment 
indicated an interest rate of 2%, while the agreement itself a 3% 
interest rate. This raised important questions as to the binding nature 
of documents given at the precontractual stage and whether these 
documents constituted an offer. Based on the testimony of the bank 
employee, the interest rate was set at 3% and the loan commitment 
rate represented solely a typing error. Given that the defendants 
were transferring the instalments of the loan in British pounds, the 
bank employee was questioned as to the appropriateness of the loan 
agreement to be paid in British pounds instead of Euros. The court 
emphasized that there was no basis on the files of the defendants for 
 
 232.  Law 160(I)/1999. 
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such a question to arise, but it could fall under the general claim of 
existence of unfair terms. The court questioned all the witnesses and 
made an evaluation on each one, indicating at the same time that this 
evaluation had no bearing on the legal aspect of the case. 
Nevertheless, the court examined the credibility of the witnesses and 
how reliable they were for the court to reach appropriate conclusions 
as to the facts. This bears a similarity to previous case law and 
indicates the importance of credibility of witnesses in order to 
ascertain their knowledge background and establish whether a 
significant imbalance exists between the parties.  
The defendant stated that he agreed that the loan was to be re-
ceived in Euros, as the bank advised him that the interest rate would 
be 2% over LIBOR. The court held that there was no evidence indi-
cating that this was the case. The defendant also argued that the loan 
agreement was a technical document that was difficult to understand 
by a layman, unless one is a lawyer, and hence he should have been 
subject to legal consultation. It was also claimed by the defendant 
that after the bank informed him that the loan agreement was a 
standard document, he placed his confidence in the bank as a trust-
worthy and professional institution. The court highlighted that it is 
not enough for a person to claim that he did not read the document 
that he subsequently signed. The consequences of a signature are not 
dependent on this.  
In other words, the consumer in similar cases bears the respon-
sibility of seeking a legal opinion, in the event that he believes it to 
be necessary. At the same time, the court places the responsibility 
upon the shoulders of consumers to be informed about the contents 
of the documents they are signing. The court linked this argument 
of insufficient information about the contents of the agreement with 
the defences available in the common law of contract. In particular, 
the court linked the argument to the non est factum defence in cases 
of fraud and misrepresentation, although the defendants did not raise 
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such defences.233 This approach signifies the courts’ belief that con-
tract law defences remedy such information imbalances. References 
were made by the court to Supreme Court of Cyprus and English 
case law in which it was held that the failure of the defendant to 
exercise reasonable care that would be expected from a contracting 
party before signing a contract constitutes an omission that cannot 
be remedied through the defence of non est factum.234 The court 
clarified that the claimant did not exercise pressure upon the defend-
ants to sign the mortgage contract. The contract was signed volun-
tarily by the defendants.  
Regarding the constitutionality of the Interest Rate Liberaliza-
tion Law,235 the defendants claimed that, based on the legislation 
that preceded the law, the act of usury by banks was impermissible; 
whereas under the Interest Rate Liberalization Law this became per-
missible, allowing the claimant to profit at the expense of the de-
fendants. Therefore, the law is a violation of the freedom to contract 
as well as the right to decent existence and social security. Article 
26.1 of the Constitution, which provides for the right to enter into 
contracts freely, stipulates that a law shall provide for the prevention 
of exploitation by persons who are commanding economic power. 
The court held that the Interest Rate Liberalization Law does not 
violate article 26 of the Constitution since a borrower is not obliged 
to conclude a contract with a bank if he disagrees with the bank’s 
ability to raise the interest rate, capitalize such rate, or impose com-
pound interest rates. The court found no grounds to examine 
whether the law was not in compliance with EU derivative law.  
Concerning the terms of the contract, the court highlighted that 
since the agreement had a standard form, all of the clauses were not 
 
 233.  The defendants argued that they “did not expect to be deceived by the 
bank” since the actions of financial institutions are controlled by the Central Bank 
of Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus. See Alpha Bank, supra note 231, §§ 198, 
208. 
 234.  Anastasiou v. Michaeloude (1998) 1 C.L.R. 264; Avon Finance Co Ltd. 
v. Bridger and another (1985) 2 All E.R. 281. 
 235.  Law 2/77. 
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individually negotiated, and the defendants were not in a position to 
influence the content of the clauses. The court stated that the Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Law of 1996236 is the law applicable 
to the case beforehand, since the conclusion of the contract preceded 
the amendments that followed.237 The court reiterated that, based on 
the law, in order to decide on whether a term is in compliance with 
the requirement of good faith, the bargaining position of the parties 
is taken into account, whether the consumer was subject to induce-
ment to agree on the particular term and whether the supplier treated 
the consumer fairly.238 Regarding the consequences of such unfair 
terms, section 6 of the law provides that contrary to the provisions 
in Cap. 149 relating to contract law, an unfair term in a contract be-
tween a supplier and a consumer does not bind the consumer. How-
ever, the contract continues to bind the parties, unless it is not pos-
sible without the said term.  
According to section 2(a) and 2(b) of the Annex to the Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Law of 1996, the supplier of financial 
services can reserve the right to unilaterally terminate the contract 
of indeterminate duration without notice, where there is a valid rea-
son, provided that the supplier informs the other contracting party 
immediately. Also, a supplier can reserve the right to alter the rate 
of interest payable by the consumer (or due to the consumer), or the 
amount of other charges for financial services without notice where 
there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier informs the other 
contracting party at the earliest opportunity and that the latter are 
free to dissolve the contract immediately.239 The court held that ex-
cept for the terms regulating the principal amount and the repay-
ments—thus, implying that they were negotiated (since they consti-
tute essential terms)—the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Law 
of 1996 applies to all other terms of the mortgage contract. The 
 
 236.  Law 93(I)/96. 
 237.  Law 69(I)/99; Law 136(I)/14; Law 49/16. 
 238.  Law 93(I)/96 at art. 5(3). 
 239.  Sections 2 (a) and (b) were abrogated by Law 136(I)/2014. 
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burden to prove that a term of the contract was individually negoti-
ated lies on the supplier. According to the court, during the course 
of the hearing, the claimants attempted to prove the acceptance of 
the contents of the contract rather than the fact that the contents were 
negotiated between the parties.  
The contract was signed 15 years before trial and was not 
subject to renegotiation until the date of termination by the 
claimants. This led the court to highlight that it could not uphold 
the fairness of the terms in a theoretical and absolute manner given 
the fact that the contract resulted in a fait accompli. Consequently, 
the court held that the mortgage contract indeed contained unfair 
terms. These terms concerned the repayment of the loan and were 
found to be in breach of the requirements of good faith. This is be-
cause, according to the contract, the bank could unilaterally, at any 
given point—and without providing any valid reason or notice—al-
ter or terminate the provisions regarding the loan repayment modal-
ities. Also, the bank had the ability to accept part payments and vary 
any terms of the agreement, or forbear time, performance or any 
other element regarding payment. The court held that these terms 
resulted in allowing the supplier to unilaterally alter the terms of the 
contract without a valid reason. Whereas section 2(b)(i) of the Un-
fair Terms in Consumer Contracts Law of 1996 provides that a sup-
plier can unilaterally alter the terms of the contract, the court em-
phasized that this exception applies to contracts of indeterminate du-
ration, which is not the case for a mortgage contract with specific 
instalments of repayment. The term providing for renunciation of 
the contract was found by the court to be unfair in the absence of a 
similar right to renunciate the contract for the consumer.  
The court then stipulated that the contract continues to be 
in force despite the existence of these terms. Based on the rul-
ing, the court should strive to restore the balance between the 
contracting parties by maintaining the validity of the agree-
ment as a whole rather than discharge it (as the defendants 
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argued for).240 This would have caused uncertainty and confu-
sion, especially after the advancement of a period of time. The 
court correctly held that the contract should continue to be in 
force since it resulted in certain consequences, excluding the 
application unfair terms (and their consequences). With a de-
claratory judgment, the contract was accordingly modified and 
restructured to exclude the unfair terms; it also set the monthly in-
stalments to be paid.  
C. The Impact on Procedural Law 
The fact that European private law in general and the good faith 
requirement in particular did not have a major impact in the devel-
opment of contract law in Cyprus is also the result of the adversarial 
system. In Cyprus, the judge acts as an arbiter of the contest between 
lawyers presenting arguments of fact and of law and is called to de-
cide based on the materials brought forward by the litigating parties. 
This is in contrast to the civil law conception of the judge who is 
called to separate relevant from irrelevant facts and supply legal 
knowledge as a public good according to the principle iura novit 
curia (the court understands the law).241 Cyprus civil procedure did 
not follow the Woolf reforms and the introduction of case manage-
ment practices, inter alia, which is only now being discussed.242  
 
 240.  The court referred to C-453/10, Jana Perenicova, Vladislav Perenic v. 
SOS finance spol. S r. o. (2012). 
 241.  See also Masahiro Kawai & Henrik Schmiegelow, Financial Crisis as a 
Catalyst for Legal Reforms: The Case of Asia, in INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION 
BETWEEN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW—THEORY AND POLICY (Michelle & 
Henrik Schmiegelow eds., Springer 2014). 
 242.  See Sir Harry Woolf, 1 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: INTERIM REPORT TO THE 
LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF ENGLAND AND WALES ch 
3, §§ 30-39 (HMSO 1995) (criticizing the adversarial system). In consultation 
with the Structural Reform Support Service of the European Commission, the Su-
preme Court of Cyprus made a request for technical assistance to support an in-
depth review of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). The Institute of Public Admin-
istration (IPA) of Ireland was appointed to undertake this work having already 
completed a number of reviews of Cypriot public authorities. The IPA provided a 
functional review of the courts system of Cyprus that lists the deficiencies and 
comes up with proposals for updating the system in order to meet the needs of the 
people of Cyprus, especially after the financial crisis. The Report was adopted in 
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A recent Supreme Court judgment indicates that the courts de-
pend on the arguments brought forward by the litigating parties. In 
particular, the Supreme Court and the first instance court were pre-
sented with an argument for the unfairness of a term in a loan con-
tract by the borrower. The Supreme Court indicated that: 
[I]t does not suffice for the party claiming an unfairness of a 
term to attach an account statement to the affidavit claiming 
that half of the amount in the current balance consists of un-
fair and abusive charges, without identifying the alleged 
charges, and expecting the judge to become an accountant 
that will identify the abusive charges.243 
An active role of the judge as provider of legal knowledge, iden-
tifier of legally relevant facts, and manager of the pace of procedure 
is argued to be a crucial factor of efficiency of justice. At the same 
time, as highlighted above, the role of the judge has repercussions 
as to the proper application of European law. In particular, the power 
of the national court to examine its own motion regarding the un-
fairness of a contractual term of an agreement in the course of a sim-
plified procedure is determined by the view that the judge takes to-
wards his role. For example, Cyprus courts have not exercised these 
powers, potentially as a result of its unwillingness to interfere be-
yond the limits that a common law judge is required to adhere to. 
However, this may also be attributed to its insufficient knowledge 
 
its entirety by the Supreme Court and was presented to the President of the repub-
lic, in May 2018, who expressed his full support for the implementation of the 
experts’ recommendations. The IPA Report, as well as the reform of the CPR, is 
part of the efforts of the government in line with the Economic Adjustment Pro-
gram, which ended in March 2016, to reorganize and improve the Cypriot judicial 
system. The program of reforms to improve the courts system focuses on four 
areas: court operations, judicial training, e-justice and the reform of the CPR. See 
IPA, Ireland, Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS) of the European Com-
mission, Functional Review of the Courts System of Cyprus (March 2018); see 
also IPA, Ireland, Progress Report: Review of the Rules of Civil Procedure of 
Cyprus (June 2018). 
 243.  Efstathiou et al. v. Hellenic Bank Public Company Ltd. (2017) Civil Ap-
peal no. 130/2012 (as translated by Mouttotos). See also Brainvibes et al. v. Bank 
of Cyprus Public Company Ltd. (2018) Civil Appeal no. 504/2012, where simi-
larly to the Efstathiou judgment, the court highlighted the failure of the appellants 
to substantiate their allegations as to the unfairness of terms in their contract. 
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of European law and the fact that the Law 93(I)/1996 provides that 
such ex officio investigation is held by the Consumer Protection Ser-
vice. Recently, Cyprus courts have been more willing to divert cases 
to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, especially arbitration, 
when faced with issues high in complexity, inviting parties to medi-
ate or recommending the appointment of an arbitrator.244  
Howells argues that the ex officio doctrine represents a departure 
from English civil procedure and makes more sense in continental 
systems, where judges may supply legal knowledge and monitor the 
court process and, hence, can raise an issue of unfairness on their 
own motion.245 Law 93(I)/1996 provides that the Director of the 
Consumer Protection Service shall investigate upon the submission 
of a complaint or of its own motion whether a contractual term in-
tended for general use is unfair contrary to the situation in England 
where the Consumer Rights Act places a duty on the court to con-
sider whether the term is fair even if none of the parties raised the 
issue.246 
The decisions of sectorial regulators are, therefore, important 
since not only they can have a major impact in changing the market 
culture, they are also specialized entities.247 Regulatory action by 
these authorities “is the front line of day-in-day-out enforcement ac-
tion against unfair terms.”248 The adherence of these authorities to 
the European concepts and the jurisprudence of the CJEU might be 
stronger than the courts, also due to the strong networks at the EU 
level between regulators.249 This might be a reaffirmation of the 
proposition that the enforcement of regulatory law is better left to 
 
 244.  The introduction of a school for training judges was the first of the eight 
projects for reforming justice in Cyprus. The recommendations provided within 
the report of Jeremy Cooper were approved by the Supreme Court and the legal 
framework for the establishment of such school is expected. 
 245.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1942. 
 246.  Art. 9(1) of Law 93(I)/1996. Consumer Rights Act 2015, Chapter 15, 
Section 71(2). 
 247.  See Howells, supra note 149, at 1947. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id. 
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public authorities.250 Additionally, in systems such as the one in Cy-
prus where judges lack specialization, time, and economies of scale, 
entrusting sectorial regulators to ensure the proper application of EU 
consumer law seems more appropriate to a certain extent. 
Nonetheless, the subsequent introduction of private rights of 
action under the New Deal for Consumers,251 which can be ar-
gued that is a contribution of the legal origins thesis, since the 
regulatory gap in the enforcement of EU law in this context, is 
purported to be filled by private litigation, is about to put more 
pressure on the courts and the traditional model in particular.252 
Private litigation, in this context, is seen as an efficient tool, 
useful to achieve certain regulatory or social goals.253 This con-
tradicts the idea of a lawsuit as a vehicle for settling disputes 
between private parties regarding private rights. It also chal-
lenges the traditional perception of civil justice, which aims at 
protecting the rights of private litigants. As Saul Zipkin also 
highlights, private enforcement schemes “reveal an effort to 
govern by making use of the courts to promote the achievement 
of the goals of substantive law, an orientation dramatically dif-
ferent from one in which courts are open to hear disputes 
properly brought before them but disclaim any role in a larger 
project of governing.”254 
 
 250.  Private enforcement may be seen as a threat to democratic governance 
since it places immense power of suing to enforce public laws in private hands. 
See late Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Friends of the Earth, Inc. et al. v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC) Inc. (2000) 528 U.S. 167, 215. 
 251.  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Directive 98/6/EC, Directive 
2005/29/EC and Directive 2011/83/EU as regards better enforcement and mod-
ernization of EU consumer protection rules, COM (2018) 185. 
 252.  Axel Halfmeier, The Role of Private Litigation in Market Regulation: 
Beyond Legal Origins, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER PROTECTION: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 300 (James Devenney, Mel Kenny, Cambridge U. Press 2012). 
 253.  See also Christopher Hodges & Naomi Creutzfeldt, Transformations in 
Public and Private Enforcement, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENFORCEMENT—
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Hans W. Micklitz & An-
drea Wechsler eds., Hart Publ’g 2016). 
 254.  Saul Zipkin, A Common Law Court in a Regulatory World, 74 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 322 (2013). 
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Collective redress mechanisms, however, raise questions as 
to the substance and the procedure as well as the divide between 
the content of a right and the institutional means of its enforce-
ment.255 The question is whether the aggregation mechanism 
travels with the right or whether it is a characteristic of the institu-
tional setting.256 Whether class wide adjudication is a matter of 
procedure, despite its effects on substance having the sole pur-
pose of aggregating claims, or whether it is a matter of substance 
has been a subject of controversy in the Supreme Court of the 
U.S.257 In the EU, since the purpose is to ensure the effective 
enforcement of EU derivative law rights, the focus is on the ag-
gregation mechanism travelling with the right. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
EU legislation as well as the Draft Common Frame of Ref-
erence258 relies on good faith in several instances finding its way 
into domestic law in those particular areas. The argument that 
was posited was that as familiarity with the concept increases, 
the debate over the acceptance of a good faith principle in Eng-
lish contract law will grow. With the eventual exit of the U.K. 
from the EU, it is still to be seen if this influence will continue 
 
 255.  Id. at 310. 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id. at 306 et seq. See, e.g., Brown Governor of California et al. v. Plata 
et al. (2011) U.S. Supreme Court 131 S. Ct. 1910, 552 Justice Scalia: 
But what procedural principle justifies certifying a class of plaintiffs so 
they may assert a claim of systemic unconstitutionality? I can think of 
two possibilities, both of which are untenable. The first is that although 
some or most plaintiffs in the class do not individually have viable 
Eighth Amendment claims, the class as a whole has collectively suffered 
an Eighth Amendment violation. That theory is contrary to the bedrock 
rule that the sole purpose of classwide adjudication is to aggregate claims 
that are individually viable. 
See also Hanna v. Plumer (1965) U.S. Supreme Court, 85 S. Ct. 1136, 464: “The 
test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights; most procedural 
rules do.” 
 258.  I PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE 
LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) (Christian von Bar & Eric 
Clive eds., Oxford U. Press 2010). 
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to take place. Although, English courts have recognized in cer-
tain cases the existence of a duty of good faith in performing the 
contract, Cyprus courts have been reluctant in recognizing this 
duty when interpreting contracts, probably as a result of limited 
contractual practice to incorporate a duty to act in good faith. 
The principles of contractual interpretation are important to 
that end, since textual and contextual interpretation differ as to 
the evidentiary basis that will be used in determining the mean-
ing of the contract: in the former a narrower evidentiary basis 
is admitted, while the latter uses a broader evidentiary basis. 
The introduction of express pre-contractual information duties 
in different areas of EU law may erode the reluctance of Cyprus 
law to impose these duties. 
In Cyprus, this formalistic stance may be seen in the major-
ity of the cases. However, examples of the shift happening in 
the jurisprudence of lower instance courts exist. These courts 
have been more receptive to consumer protection and welcom-
ing of the European concepts to a certain extent, although ini-
tially they have given the principle of good faith a common law 
gloss, by limiting it to an absence of dishonesty. What can be 
clearly deduced from the jurisprudence is that Cyprus courts 
take a unifying view of contract law, without necessarily mak-
ing the distinction between consumer law and commercial law. 
The approach of the Supreme Court, contrariwise, is one re-
flecting a self-interest/self-reliance ethic. This can be con-
trasted to the CJEU case law, which arguably has used the Un-
fair Contract Terms Directive proactively in order to protect 
consumers affected by social crises.259  
The Supreme Court’s approach can be attributed to the sta-
tus of Cyprus as a service-based economy and the importance 
of the financial services sector. Therefore, as was the case with 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of the U.K. in Office of Fair 
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Trading v. Abbey National plc, where it refused to review the 
unfairness of the bank charges as this might dramatically im-
pact banks,260 a similar pro-bank stance might be reflected in 
the caselaw of the Supreme Court of Cyprus. If these claims 
would have been successful, or are successful in the future, 
banks “would be facing an Armageddon claim . . . . Given the 
economic climate and the state support for the banking sector, 
the taxpayer would be left to pick up the bill.”261 Financial sta-
bility is, thus, the overarching principle.262 This is reinforced 
by the recent judgment of the CJEU in Hellenische Republik v. 
Leo Kuhn.263 
 
 260.  Id. at 1934. 
 261.  Phillip Morgan, Bank Charges and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Con-
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